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ABSTRACT 
PROTECTING PRIVACY AND ENSURING SECURITY OF RFID SYSTEMS USING 
PRIVATE AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS 
 
 
Md. Endadul Hoque 
 
Marquette University, 2010 
 
 
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) systems have been studied as an emerging 
technology for automatic identification of objects and assets in various applications ranging from 
inventory tracking to point of sale applications and from healthcare applications to e-passport. 
The expansion of RFID technology, however, gives rise to severe security and privacy concerns. 
To ensure the widespread deployment of this technology, the security and privacy threats must be 
addressed. However, providing solutions to the security and privacy threats has been a challenge 
due to extremely inadequate resources of typical RFID tags. Authentication protocols can be a 
possible solution to secure RFID communications. 
 
In this thesis, we consider RFID authentication protocols based on symmetric key 
cryptography. We identify the security and privacy requirements for an RFID system. We present 
four protocols in this thesis. First, we propose a lightweight authentication protocol for typical 
tags that can perform symmetric key operations. This protocol makes use of pseudo random 
number generators (PRNG) and one way hash functions to ensure the security and privacy 
requirements of RFID systems. Second, we define the desynchronizing attack and describe the 
vulnerabilities of this attack in RFID systems. We propose a robust authentication protocol that 
can prevent the desynchronizing attack. This protocol can recover the disabled tags that are 
desynchronized with the reader because of this attack. Third, we introduce a novel authentication 
protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) to avoid the counterfeiting problem of RFID 
systems. This protocol is appropriate for the RFID tags that can perform the operations of ECC. 
Finally, to address the tradeoff between scalability and privacy of RFID systems, we propose an 
efficient anonymous authentication protocol. We characterize the privacy of RFID systems and 
prove that our protocol preserves the privacy of RFID tags and achieves better scalability as well. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) is identified as emerging technology that is 
utilized by various applications to automatically identify objects such as objects and/or assets. 
The main benefits of RFID systems are that they can provide automated contactless identification 
of a range of physical entities. Usually, an RFID tag is a wireless transponder. Information stored 
on a tag can be read by special transceivers called RFID readers without requiring line-of-sight. 
The first known application of RFID was the “friend or foe” identification system used in 
fighter planes in World War II [Royal40]. After a few decades, RFID technology gains the 
attention because of its inherent capability of being used as a replacement for bar codes in supply 
chain and inventory management [Juels06]. Nowadays, because of its low cost and ease of use, 
RFID technology has become  widespread, including in point of sale applications [Juels06], 
product tracking in supply chain management [Juels06, Kerschbaum09], automated fare 
collection in public transportation [Garfinkel05], animal tracking to child supervision, healthcare 
applications [Juels06].  
1.1 Overview of an RFID system 
An RFID system has three major components: RFID tags, RFID readers and a backend 
server. We now briefly describe each of these components. 
RFID tags: An RFID tag is an identification device which usually has an identifier and 
which transmits data wirelessly using radio frequency (RF) in response to interrogation by an 
RFID reader. A tag is a tiny chip which consists of an antenna and an integrated circuit. This IC is 
used for storage, signal modulation, and signal demodulation. The antenna is used for the 
communication with readers via radio frequency. When a tag receives a specific radio signal, it 
automatically transmits a reply. An RFID tag is shown in Figure 1.1. 
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Depending on the power supply, tags are categorized into three types: passive, active and 
semi-passive tags. Passive tags have no power source on board. They draw power from an RF 
signal sent by the readers. Therefore, in the absence of a reader, they cannot communicate, not 
even compute. The second type is active tags which have on board power source. They do not 
have to rely on the readers (or on other devices) for computation and communication with the 
readers. Semi-passive tags are the combination of both the active and passive RFID technology. 
They have their own power source for only computation purpose, not for communication. They 
rely on the RF signals sent by the readers to send or receive data. 
 
Figure 1.1: An RFID tag (source: http://www.barcode-solutions.com) 
Depending on the processing capability, RFID tags can be categorized in two types: 
dumb and smart. Dumb tags have no significant processing power expect the communication 
capability for which they rely on the readers’ RF signal. They contain fixed length unique 
identifiers which they reply in response to interrogation by readers. Even their memory capacity 
is fairly small – from few hundred bytes to maximum 2kBytes [Laurie07]. On the other hand, 
smart tags have on board processers that can capable of performing cryptographic operations 
[Laurie07]. Their memory capacity is much larger than that of dumb tags. They usually have 
32kBytes or more memory [Laurie07]. They are capable of performing authentication before 
sending the stored data. 
RFID readers: An RFID reader is a transceiver that interrogates and read data from tags. 
A reader uses its antenna to broadcast an RF signal which is used to start the interrogation. 
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Typically readers are connected to a backend server which has a database of tag information. 
Readers forward responses of tags to the backend server for further processing. An RFID reader 
is shown in Figure 1.2. 
 
Figure 1.2: An RFID reader (source: http://www.barcode-solutions.com) 
Backend server: A backend server is equipped with a database of tag information. It can 
retrieve the detailed information of a tag by using the tag’s response as a key. Depending on the 
applications, the communication can be started by the backend server or by readers. Usually, 
when the backend server wants to identify one or more tags, a reader broadcasts an RF signal. 
Any tag within the range of the signal responds to the reader. The reader forwards the tag’s 
response to the backend server. Then the backend server processes the response to identify the 
tag. If the server identifies the tag successfully, it can retrieve the detailed information of the tag. 
Figure 1.3 shows a typical RFID system. 
 
Figure 1.3: An RFID system 
Secured channels Unsecured channels
…1011...
Backend server
Reader
Tag
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1.2 Motivation 
The expansion of RFID technology is limited because it gives rise to serious security and 
privacy concerns, such as eavesdropping, cloning, impersonations, and tracking of end users.
Since a reader and a tag communicate via a wireless radio communication channels, their 
interactions are susceptible to eavesdropping and/or manipulation. If a tag replies its unique 
identifier to authenticate itself to the reader, this fixed response becomes a signature of the tag 
which opens the possibility of being tracked. Thus the privacy of the tag holder can be invaded. 
So these security and privacy issues must be addressed before the widespread deployment of 
RFID tags.  
Conventional security primitives cannot be integrated in RFID tags since they have 
inadequate computation capabilities with extremely limited resources. That is why research 
community devote themselves in search of appropriate solutions that will ensure RFID privacy 
and security without compromising the cost. Authentication can be one approach to address such 
security and privacy threats. An RFID system can use a tag authentication scheme in which a tag 
can be identified and verified by the backend server without disclosing the tag’s identifier to the 
eavesdropper. In addition, authentication also ensures that only authorized reader can access a 
tag. Since tags are under heavy threats of adversaries, it is also mandatory to make sure that the 
tag’s reply is accurate. 
Public key cryptography is infeasible for the current RFID tags because of their limited 
resources. However, the current tags can perform symmetric key cryptography such as hash 
functions and symmetric encryption algorithms. So far various authentication protocols to address 
the security and privacy threats in RFID system by using symmetric key cryptography have been 
proposed in literature. We discuss some relevant protocols in the chapter 2 but they all have some 
limitations in terms privacy, security and/or performance. This motivates us to develop new 
authentication protocols that can perform better as well as address the security and privacy 
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challenges. In this thesis, we focus on the solutions to the security and privacy threats at the 
protocol level, though some hardware based solutions have been proposed to ensure the security 
of RFID systems. 
1.3 Main contributions 
The main contributions of this thesis are as follows: 
1. We identify the security and privacy requirements for an RFID system. 
2. Our contributions include the assessment of some prior authentication protocols 
against the identified security and privacy requirements. 
3. We present a lightweight authentication protocol for typical RFID tags that can 
perform symmetric key cryptography such as hash functions. This protocol 
addresses the identified security and privacy requirements. 
4. We define desynchronizing attack and propose a robust authentication protocol 
that supports recovery against this attack. We analyze this protocol against the 
identified security and privacy requirements for an RFID system. 
5. We introduce a novel authentication protocol based on Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography (ECC) to avoid the counterfeiting problem in RFID systems. This 
protocol is appropriate for an RFID system where tags are capable of performing 
the operations of elliptic curve cryptography. 
6. Finally, we characterize the privacy of RFID systems. We present an efficient 
anonymous authentication protocol that addresses the tradeoff between 
scalability and privacy of RFID systems. This protocol improves the scalability 
of an RFID system. However, it not only prevents the security attacks but also 
preserves the privacy of tags. In fact, we prove that our protocol preserves the 
privacy of RFID tags. 
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1.4 Thesis Organization 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: 
1. In chapter 2, we present the security and privacy requirements for an RFID 
system along with the assessment of some prior works against the identified 
requirements. 
2. We present our lightweight authentication protocol in chapter 3. In addition to 
the protocol description, we describe an attack model and analyze the protocol 
with respect to this attack model. 
3. In chapter 4, we define the desynchronizing attack and describe how this attack 
can disable tags so that the tags cannot be identified by the valid reader in future. 
We propose a robust authentication protocol that not only recovers the RFID 
system from this disabled state to the normal operating state but also supports the 
identified security and privacy requirements. 
4. In chapter 5, we introduce an ECC based authentication protocol for RFID 
systems where tags can perform ECC based operations. We present the security 
and privacy analysis of the protocol with respect to a proposed attack model. 
5. In chapter 6, we propose an efficient anonymous authentication protocol as a 
solution to the tradeoff between the scalability and privacy problem of RFID 
systems. We define the characteristics of RFID privacy. Based on this notion of 
RFID privacy, we prove that our protocol protects privacy of RFID tags and 
thereby the privacy of tag holders. 
6. Finally in chapter 7 we summarize the contributions of the thesis and present 
some future research directions. 
1.5 Publications 
7 
Some materials of this thesis have been published in [Ahamed08A, Ahamed08B, 
Hoque09A, and Hoque09B]. The protocol of chapter 3 has been first published in [Ahamed08A]. 
A extended version of this work can be found in [Hoque09A]. The contents of [Hoque09B] form 
the basis of chapter 4. The protocol of chapter 5 can be found in [Ahamed08B]. 
  
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Chapter 2: Related Work 
To design a solution to security and privacy threats, the goals or requirements need to be 
identified. In this chapter, we first present our identified security and privacy requirements for an 
RFID system. Then we assess some prior works against the identified requirements. Though a 
considerable volume of papers have been published so far, here we present some prior works that 
are quite relevant to our proposals. 
2.1 Security and privacy requirements for an RFID system 
Several real life applications of RFID systems require them to be secure and protective 
against security and privacy related attacks. Considering those applications and analyzing their 
security requirements, we identify the following security and privacy goals for an RFID system. 
A safety ring composed of all these security and privacy goals is depicted in Figure 2.1. An RFID 
system ensuring all the six elements of this safety ring is considered to be secured and protected 
against all major attacks. The elements of the safety ring are explained in the following. 
1) Protect Privacy: RFID technology raises privacy concerns in some situations. For 
example, consumer privacy is invaded when the use of RFID enables unauthorized parties to 
obtain personally identifiable information, including location information of the tag holder. So it 
should be guaranteed that a tag or its secret data cannot be distinguished without tampering it. 
2) Prevent Tracking: Consumer community never wants to be tracked. Therefore, 
preventing tracking is another major goal of authentication protocol. If an adversary does not 
have any identifiable information of a tag, then she cannot track the tag. But if a tag replies with a 
constant response each time it is queried, then it becomes a signature of the tag. As a result, this 
signature allows the adversary to track the tag. So it should be ensured by the protocol that a tag 
neither reveals its unique identifier nor replies with a constant response. 
Figure
3) Deal with Denial of Service
prevented from accessing its authorized entities. Therefore, the availability of 
mainly depends on the assurance of this goal. An RFID system should continue running and 
provide service to its authorized u
possible to detect all kinds of DoS attack, authentication protocols should at least provide a way 
to deal with them. Protocols should be able to take measure against vulnerable action
adversaries and recover the system that is under the DoS attacks.
4) Ensure Forward Secrecy:
tag and learns the secret key shared between 
the previous responses originated from
forward secrecy should be ensured by authentication protocol. 
5) Lessen susceptibility to replay attack:
replying a message that she eavesdrops from an earlier authentication session between a reader 
and a tag. Under this attack, the adversary can fool the reader as well as the tag. She can 
impersonate the tag by replying the tag’s response to the reader. An a
ensure that an attacker cannot impersonate a legitimate tag by 
message. 
 
 2.1: Six elements of the “Safety Ring” 
 (DoS) attack: DoS attack means that an entity is 
an 
sers even if an adversary launches DoS attack. 
 
 Forward secrecy means that if an adversary compromises a 
the tag and the reader, she will be unable to identify 
 the tag. In order to maintain the security 
 
 An adversary can launch a replay attack by just 
uthentication protocol must 
just replaying an eavesdropped 
9 
RFID system 
Since it is not 
s of the 
of RFID systems, 
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6) Prevent Cloning: One important application of RFID systems is to detect counterfeit 
products. In order to avoid counterfeiting, RFID tags need to be designed in such a way that an 
adversary cannot clone the tags. Since this is a hardware based solution to the cloning attack, we 
are interested in the solutions to attacks at the protocol level. The adversary can clone a tag if she 
knows the secret key shared by the tag with the authorized reader. So, to be secured against 
cloning attack, protocols should never reveal the shared secret key. 
2.2 Relevant authentication protocols 
We categorized the prior works in two classes: symmetric key based schemes and public 
key based schemes. Although some schemes focus on providing the security solutions integrated 
in basic RFID tags (e.g., blocker tags [Juels03], RFID Guardian [Rieback05]), here we consider 
only the protocol level solutions. 
2.2.1 Symmetric key schemes in RFID 
In this subsection, we describe the most significant symmetric-key protocols proposed for 
RFID security and privacy. 
Deterministic hash locks protocol. Weis et al. [Weis03] first proposed a 
cryptographically controlled access for RFID systems using hash locks. This scheme controls 
access to a tag by locking or unlocking the tag using a one way hash function . Each tag stores 
an identifier and the hash value of a secret key. A tag replies with the hash value in response to a 
reader’s query. The valid reader can look up the secret key of the tag in a database of key-hash 
pairs. The valid reader proves itself by sending the tag’s secret key so that the tag can verifies the 
key using the hash function by comparing with the stored hash value. Finally, the tag releases its 
data if the correct key is given by the reader. This protocol can protect the actual data on the tag, 
but the static hash value would still be traceable. 
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Randomized hash locks protocol. To address the problem of the deterministic hash 
locks protocol, Weis et al. [Weis03] proposed randomized hash locks protocol, a modified 
version of the above protocol. This protocol makes use of a nonce1 to introduce randomness in 
tags’ responses. A tag generates a nonce  and sends the pair     to the server each 
time the tag is queried. This protocol addresses the traceability problem, but prompts the reader to 
brute-force its inventory for any  that matches the given hash if concatenated with . In 
addition, this protocol is susceptible to replay attack, where an adversary can reply with the tag’s 
response that she learned by eavesdropping in an earlier authentication session. The reader 
accepts this replay response as legitimate. 
Improved Randomized hash locks protocol. Juels and Weis [Juels07] proposed an 
improved randomized hash locks protocol for RFID systems that protects the privacy of RFID 
tags as well as prevent replay attack. In this protocol, the server generates a nonce 	 and queries 
the tag with this nonce. The tag produces another nonce 
 and sends the pair 
   	 

 as the response. Therefore the server has to perform a linear search in the database for any 
 that matches the given hash if concatenated with 	 and 
. This protocol offers strong tag 
privacy in front of eavesdroppers. However, the limitation of this protocol is poor scalability. 
OSK protocol. Ohkubo et al. [Ohkubo03] proposed an RFID privacy protection scheme 
designed to protect against tracking and provide forward security2. The protocol makes use of 
hash-chains. The server stores a secret key  and a identifier  for each tag . The tag  
initially stores the secret key  as . The tag replies with a hash value of the key 	 to the 
server and updates the key as   
. The server then identifies the tag via an exhaustive 
search, computing 	 
 for each tag in the database until it finds a match with 	, 
where 
 means the  iterations of the function 
. This protocol is susceptible to replay attack 
 
1
 Nonce is a random or pseudo random number that never repeats its value. 
2
 Forward security means that if an adversary compromises a tag, she will not able to trace back the entire 
history of the tag’s responses. 
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where an adversary can impersonate a tag with knowing the secret key. In addition, this protocol 
also has the scalability problem. 
Dimitriou protocol. Dimitriou [Dimitriou05] proposed a mutual authentication of both 
tags and the server. The general idea is that the server updates a tag’s identifier if the tag proves 
its identity to the server and the tag updates its own identifier only when the server proves its 
validity to the tag. Thus this protocol keeps both the server and the tag always in perfect 
synchronization. Though this protocol protection against tag cloning, it is subject to tracking and 
denial-of-service attack. The response of the tag is static between two valid sessions, and thus it 
makes the system susceptible to tracking. In addition, if the server’s response (that the server 
sends to the tag to prove its validity) does not reach the tag in a session, the tag becomes 
desynchronized with the server. 
Molnar-Wagner protocol. A tree based protocol first proposed by Molnar and Wagner 
[Molnar04] reduces the reader’s complexity from linear search to logarithmic search. This is a 
tree based approach where keys are arranged in tree and tags are assigned to the leaves. Instead of 
a single secret key, each tag stores a series of keys along the path of the tree from the root to the 
leaf assigned to the tag. After receiving a challenge from the server, the tag replies its response 
using all its keys. The server, then, finds the tree from the root to the leaves to verify whether the 
tag has a valid key at each level of the tree. According to this scheme, the server needs   
operations to identify a tag, where  is the number of tags in the system and  is the branching 
factor of the key tree. Though this scheme provides scalability, however, it sacrifices some 
privacy of tags when any tag is compromised by the adversary. 
YA-TRAP protocol. A trivial RFID tag identification protocol proposed by Tsudik 
[Tsudik06] uses timestamps to improve scalability and provide protection against tracking. The 
server queries a tag with the current timestamp (. The tag replies a random number if    
or  ! ", where  is the timestamp stored on the tag and " is the maximum possible 
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timestamp. If the server is valid, the server’s timestamp would be    # ". Upon receiving a 
query from the valid server, the tag updates its    and replies with a keyed hash value 
$%, where  is the unique secret key of the tag. The server then identifies the tag by finding 
the response in its lookup table. This protocol needs & operations to identify a tag and thereby 
improves scalability. However, this scheme is susceptible to denial-of-service attack. 
HB+-protocol. To lower the requirements of cryptographic functions for RFID tags, Juels 
and Weis [Juels05] proposed a lightweight authentication protocol based on the famous human-
to-computer authentication, Hopper and Blum (HB) protocol. This simple symmetric 
authentication protocol requires low-cost implementation. The hardness of this protocol is same 
as the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem. However, this protocol is vulnerable to an 
active attack like message manipulation. 
Tan-Sheng-Li protocol. The server of an RFID system can become a single point-of-
failure if the server is compromised by an adversary. A serverless protocol first proposed by Tan 
et al. [Tan07] removes the vulnerability of a single point-of-failure in RFID systems. In this 
protocol, the reader, instead of the server, maintains a list of secret information of the tags that the 
reader has access to. Contrary, each tag has a secret . The tag shares this secret information with 
no one of the system, not even with the reader. However, both the reader and the tag know 
$ , where  is reader identifier and $'' is a hash function. In response to the query from the 
reader, tag replies with some of the bits of $   ( ) (  ( ), where ) and ) are two 
random numbers generated by the reader and the tag, respectively and *  is a one way hash 
function. Along with the response, the tag queries the reader with a question string. Only the 
legitimate reader can reply with the valid answer string which proves the reader’s legitimacy to 
the tag. The tag releases its data after checking that the reader is valid. But this protocol suffers 
because of poor scalability. Even the protocol 2 [Tan07] is not completely anonymous as the tag 
replies with some bits of its identifier.  
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2.2.2 Public key schemes in RFID 
Public key cryptography is not feasible because of the inadequate computation and 
storage complexity of RFID tags. Typical RFID tags are not capable of performing the expensive 
operations of public key cryptography. On the other hand, strong privacy must be achieved before 
the widespread deployment of RFID systems. Public key cryptography seems to the best solution 
to protect consumer privacy. Therefore, a lot of works has been done to analyze and adapt the 
public key protocols for RFID systems. In [Tuyls06], the author proposed that the Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography (ECC) can be implemented on RFID tags using less than 5000 gates. The 
feasibility of ECC implementation on RFID tags is also proposed in [Wolkerstorfer05, Hein09]. 
These public key cryptography based techniques for identification are mainly based on Elliptic 
Curves Discrete Logarithmic Problem (ECDLP) [Okamoto92]. Some of the significant protocols 
for RFID systems based on public key cryptography are proposed in [Batina06A, Batina06B, 
Bringer08, Deursen09, Lee08A, Lee08B, and Lee09]. We will not describe these protocols here, 
since our focus is on the symmetric key protocols for RFID security and privacy. 
  
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Chapter 3: A Lightweight Serverless RFID Authentication 
Protocol 
3.1 Introduction 
So far all the security and privacy requirements of RFID systems were ensured by central 
databases. This server based model has drawn much consideration and some of the outcomes are 
reflected in [Avoine05, Burmester06, Conti07, Cui07, Seo06A, Seo07B, Tsudik06 and Vajda03].  
According to the fundamental architecture of an RFID system, a reader scans a tag and relays the 
information to the backend server. Other than the back end database, no other component of this 
system (not even a reader) is able to infer any information from the tag’s response since it is 
encrypted. The server returns an acknowledgement (sometimes the tag’s data) to the reader only 
after verifying both the tag and the reader. Typically only the central server can authenticate the 
involved tag and the reader. In the server based system the central server indeed plays an essential 
role of checking the validity of the tag and the reader, which is very important for privacy 
protection and security issues. Consequently a malicious reader could hardly obtain precious 
information from the tags of this server based system. 
The major drawback of such system is that the readers always have to be connected to the 
server, which limits usage of RFID systems in remote locations where the connectivity with the 
server cannot always be ensured. Besides, having a single database makes the whole system more 
vulnerable to privacy attacks. Having the knowledge of all tag secrets and tag information, the 
central server becomes a single point-of-failure. As a result, if the server is captured by an 
adversary, privacy of the entire user community is jeopardized. Therefore a serverless RFID 
system is proposed in [Tan07] addressing the shortcomings of the server based system. Tan et al. 
paper introduces an RFID system to the world where a gigantic central server is not a single 
point-of-failure anymore. 
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An alternative solution, but analogous to the central server system, is to transfer the 
information of the tags from the central server to the reader that has access to these tags.  In such 
serverless system, a reader has to identify legitimate tags all by itself because of the absence of 
server. At the same time, in order to receive the tag’s data the reader has to prove himself as 
legitimate to the tag. But because of the mobile nature of the readers, they can be stolen like tags. 
An adversary with a stolen reader can have access to all the information of the tags that the stolen 
reader has access to. This information may include the ID and the tag secret number of the tags.  
Any single pair can be loaded into a blank tag by the adversary. This fake tag can now 
impersonate the legitimate tag and as a result a valid reader cannot distinguish between these two 
tags. This is a severe breach in the security of an RFID system.  
Existing solutions cannot be applied to the security problem of the RFID systems because 
of the limited resources of the tags. Due to the lack of security, the use of RFID technology has 
been restricted to a closed set of pervasive applications. However, the number of applications will 
be increased if secure serverless systems are introduced. One of the major advantages of the 
serverless RFID system is that it reduces the cost of system deployment in large application areas. 
On the other hand, to ensure security and privacy of the system, lightweight solutions are required 
because of the resource limitation of the tags. In this chapter we propose a lightweight 
authentication protocol that can provide security and privacy protection similar to the central 
server model without having persistent connection with the server. A version of this protocol has 
been presented in [Ahamed08A, Hoque09A]. 
3.2 System architecture 
The RFID system generally consists of tags, the reader, and the backend server. 
However, ours is a serverless system. The serverless RFID system primarily consists of two 
entities the reader and a set of tags. A certification authority is involved in the system to certify 
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the readers and authorize them to particular tags. Next we discuss components of an RFID 
system. 
Tag: Each tag  is comprised of an IC chip and an antenna. The tag sends information to 
the RFID reader in response through wireless medium. We focus on passive tags which are 
expected to be the most common type of RFID tags. In our system, each tag is able to 
communicate with one reader at a time. 
Reader: A reader R is a device that sends some query using the radio frequency signal to 
a tag, receives the response from the tag, and performs some important computation on those 
responses. 
Certification authority: The certification authority +, is a trusted party that plays the 
crucial role during the deployment. +, initializes each tag by writing the tag secret into the tag’s 
memory. Moreover the certification authority certifies each reader in the system and authorizes 
each reader’s access to a particular set of tags. The communication channel between the reader 
and the tag is assumed to be vulnerable to several attacks. However, the channel between the 
reader and the +, is assumed to be secure. 
3.3 The lightweight authentication protocol 
3.3.1 Notations and assumptions 
All the notations of this protocol are presented in Table 3.1. Each tag and each reader 
have the knowledge of two functions -*  and * . The function -*  is a fairly simple random 
number generator that can be implemented at low cost. -*  takes a seed as an argument and 
outputs a pseudorandom number according to its distribution. *  is used by all the readers and 
the tags to generate the next seed of the pseudorandom number generator by passing the current 
seed as input. *  is an irreversible one way hash function. Therefore a current seed cannot be 
linked with the previous one.  
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Table 3.1: Notations for the lightweight authentication protocol 
Symbol Meaning 
 . /th reader of the system 
  th tag of the system 
 -*  Pseudo random number generator 
 *  One way hash function 
  the identifier of the /th reader 
 0 the contact list of . 
 /1 the identifier of the th tag 
  the secret of the th tag 
 221 . receives this seed from +, for  
 22134  receives this seed for the . from +, 
 ,5 the adversary 
 
A reader . has a unique identifier  and a contact list 0. .(obtains  and 0 from the 
+, during the system deployment. On the other hand, the +, initializes each tag  with a unique 
identifier /1 and a unique secret  by writing in his nonvolatile memory. The contact list 0 
contains information about the tags that . has access to. If . is authorized to access a set of 
tags, say 	6(6(6 7,  0 becomes,  
0 8 9# 221  /1 ! :/1 8 identi@ier(of((Cnd(221 8 neDt(Eeed(of((Cnd(&    )F* 
In other words, 
0 8 G# 221	 /1	 ! H  # 2217 /17 !I. 
Now we discuss the seed mentioned above. Each tag  contains only one seed for the 
one authorized reader .. While the tag  is deployed by the +,,  receives 22134 8    
from the(+, where *  is one way hash function and  represents concatenation.  stores the 
22134 in the tag’s nonvolatile memory. On the other hand, the reader . receives the contact list 
0 during the deployment where 221 8    J K L& )M. The reader . uses these seeds to 
communicate with the tags. Note that . does not know the tag secret . The reader only knows 
the outcome of the function    as 221. Since the initial 221 is computed by the +,, 
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the reader . can never learn  from the received 221. We also assume that(+, cannot be 
compromised by any adversary. In this chapter we denote an adversary by ,5.  
(1) . N ( (((((O(((((((2PQ2 R)1  
(2)  (((((((((((((( S ((((((TUVUWXYU(R)1 
(3)                          ZUY() 8 - [22134 \ R)1  R)1]  
(4) .  ( (( ( S (((((( ) R)1  
(5) . (((((((((((((( S (((((ZUY() 8 R)1  
(6)                 ^_W(each # 221" /1" !(K 0  
(7)               set(()" 8 - 221" \ R)1  R)1   
(8)               if ()" 88 ( )(then 
(9)          set( 8 221" 
(10)          set() 8 (-  
(11)          set(221" 8 ((  
(12)                                          break 
(13)                                       end if 
(14)                          end for 
(15)                  . N (  S ( ) 
(16)  ((((((((((((((( S (((((set( 8  22134  
(17)                  set(R 8 - 
(18)                 if(R 88 )(then 
(19)              22134 8   
(20)                else 
(21)             .2R12(/()`(RQ`/a21( 
                                                 (/(/(R)(R1b2Rc 
 
Figure 3.1: The lightweight authentication protocol 
3.3.2 Protocol description 
The protocol is shown in Figure 3.1. At the beginning, the reader . transmits a 2PQ2 
and a random number R)1 to the tag . Upon the reception of the 2PQ2 and the R)1,  
generates a random number R)1 and computes ) 8 - [22134 \ R)1  R)1]. To 
prove own legitimacy, the tag replies with ) and R)1. Now the reader has to verify the 
legitimacy of the tag. The reader calculates )" 8 - 221" \ R)1  R)1 for each 
# 221" /1" !(K 0 and searches for a match between the received ) and the produced )". If 
the reader finds a match, the reader becomes sure about the validity of the tag. Since it is a mutual 
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authentication, the reader has to prove itself to the queried tag. After identifying the tag, the 
reader will produce a pseudo random number ()(after generating the next seed from the seed of 
the particular tag using the hash function and will update the new seed after hashing the current 
seed (produced to compute )) using the same function. If the reader fails to find a match, it 
generates a random number () 8 R)1) and concludes  is a fake tag. Then, the reader replies 
) to the tag. To verify the validity of the reader, the tag produces a pseudo random number (R 
after generating the next seed from its current seed 22134. If the tag finds a match between R and 
), the tag also updates its own seed using the same hash function and concludes . as the 
authorized reader. Otherwise,  decides that the reader is not an authorized one or this is an 
adversary. In this protocol, both the reader and the tag update their seeds after they confirm the 
validity of the opposite party. 
3.3.3 Interaction diagram 
Figure 3.2 shows a detailed interaction diagram of our authentication protocol where the 
reader . is communicating with the tag 
.  
3.4 Attack model 
The major goal of an adversary in any RFID system is to counterfeit a real tag such that 
the fake tag can only be distinguished from the real one with a small probability. As a result, the 
fake tag (the fake product as well) will be identified as a legitimate one. In this chapter, an 
adversary is denoted as ,5. This adversary can control a number of readers and tags. Each reader 
and tag controlled by the adversary are denoted as .d and d, respectively. .d is unauthorized to 
have access to any real tags as this adversarial reader fails to prove own identity to the +,. 
Similarly, d is not valid since it has no idea about the seed and the tag secret. We presume that 
the certification authority cannot be compromised. Otherwise, the adversary would get total 
21 
control over all the tags. We also assume that all the entities such as tags, readers, adversaries, 
adversarial tags and adversarial readers have polynomially bounded resources. 
 
221	 /1	 
221
 /1
 
221e /1e 
221f /1f 
221g /1g 
 
221	 /1	 
221
 /1
 
221e /1e 
221f /1f 
221g /1g 
 
221	 /1	 
221
 /1
 
221e /1e 
221f /1f 
221g /1g 
 
221	 /1	 
hiijk /1
 
221e /1e 
221f /1f 
221g /1g 
 
221	 /1	 
221
 /1
 
221e /1e 
221f /1f 
221g /1g 
Figure 3.2: Detail interactions of the authentication protocol between the reader lm and the tag nk 
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Step 3: Upon receiving qk, the reader computes next pseudorandom number using hiij \ ysqjm  ysqjk 
for each tag in vm and compares with qk
opqrstr(umhr(vm
2213w
2213x
qm

	 

e
|
} g
	~
	
lm
   Reade
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Step 5: Upon receiving qm, nk generates next pseudorandom number s from its sequence and finds a match 
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Our assumption includes that ,5 is more powerful than a passive attacker. Like a passive 
attacker, she can eavesdrop on the both the channels between a valid reader and a valid tag. 
However, like an active attacker, ,5 can install a rouge reader .d that can communicate with a valid 
tag. In addition, the adversary can also install a fake tag d to communicate with a legitimate 
reader. In both cases, the ultimate goal of the adversary is to counterfeit a tag with the learned 
information. In addition to these attacks, ,5 can launch hardware based physical attacks, while 
these hardware based physical attacks are beyond the scope of this chapter. We will address the 
attacks on the protocol layer. 
3.5 Analysis of the protocol 
We analyze our protocol in two steps. First we present the security and privacy analysis 
followed by the cost analysis. 
3.5.1 Security and  privacy analysis 
In this subsection, we analyze our proposed authentication protocol against different 
types of attacks. For every attack, we first describe how the attack is launched by an adversary. 
Then we explain how our protocol protects the system against the attack. . and  are referred to 
as a legitimate reader and tag. 
Privacy protection: If an adversary ,5 comes across any private information of the tag by 
querying it, she may cause several vulnerabilities to the owner’s day to day life. We assume that 
,5 may target a list of tags and attack each tag for a fixed number of times. ,5 queries the tags to 
discover the /1 of the tag and thereby some private information of the product or the tag owner. 
But our protocol strongly protects user privacy because a tag never sends its own /1 to anyone, 
not even to the authorized reader. Each tag sends its reply in disguise so that only an authorized 
reader can identify the tag. Moreover, no one is able to infer or learn the /1 of the tag by simply 
looking at the tag’s responses or by simply querying the tag. Under this attack, the adversary has 
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a list of targeted RFID tags. The adversary queries each tag within the group to determine which 
tags of her list exist within this group. According to our protocol, each time a reader queries a tag 
, it replies to the reader with a new response - [22134 \ R)1  R)1]. Therefore ,5 fails 
to link any two responses and thereby fails to identify which one of the tags is replying. Thus our 
protocol protects the privacy of the tag. 
Tracking: The adversary ,5 tries to track  over time. ,5 succeeds if she is able to 
distinguish  from other tags. Under this attack, ,5 repeatedly queries  with a value which 
yields a consistent reply. This consistent reply becomes a signature of . To launch this attack, ,5 
can reuse the same R)1 learned from any previous session of our protocol. By incorporating 
R)1, our protocol becomes secured against tracking since ,5 cannot predict R)1 ahead of 
time. Consequently,  will reply a new pseudo random number each time it is queried. Moreover, 
when ,5 learns the R)1 from any previous successful authentication session, 22134 has been 
updated to a new value. Thus, ,5 fails to get any consistent reply from . As a result, she cannot 
track  afterwards. 
Cloning: Under this attack, ,5 queries  and places the response in a fake tag. Let this 
fake tag be  . Now, ,5 wants to pass off the forged tag as legitimate and she becomes successful 
if she can fool a legitimate reader .. According to our protocol, whenever the adversary queries 
, she receives a different response each time because of R)1 and R)1. Now, if ,5 places this 
response in  , she will never be able to fool a valid .. When   is queried by .,   cannot 
generate the actual response.   fails because for each query, . transmits a new R)1 that ,5 
cannot predict at the time of producing the fake tag. On the other hand, since   does not know the 
current seed stored on , the fake tag(cannot generate the actual response while queried by .. 
Denial of Service (DoS): In this attack, ,5 does not want to derive any information or 
impersonate the reader or the tag. The main target of the adversary is to ensure that a reader 
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cannot access its authorized tags. To launch a DoS attack, ,5 places many requests to the backend 
server so that the readers are unable to communicate with the backend server. This problem 
becomes severe when the backend database shares a secret key with the tag that has to be 
synchronized after each successful authentication. Our protocol eliminates the need of a backend 
server. So, synchronization between the server and the tag is not required any more. Moreover, in 
our scheme, a reader communicates with the backend server only at the time of deployment. 
Physical attack: Physical attack means ,5 can compromise either a tag or a reader. We 
will consider both the cases. 
A.  compromises lm: When ,5 compromises a reader ., the adversary will know the 
reader’s contact list 0 and the id . She can now impersonate .(and prove herself to , if the 
reader has been authorized to access . Eventually, she is able to access the tags 	 
 H  7, if 
. has access to these tags. Now, the security goal is to prevent ,5 from using this knowledge to 
create any counterfeit tag. Let (resides in the contact list 0, and ,5 wishes to counterfeit the tag 
(which we name  . The adversary will be successful if    can fool another legitimate reader 
.. But under our scheme, only one reader is authorized to access  and that reader is .. So,   
cannot fool . by learning 221 and /1 from 0. 
B.  compromises n: In this case, the adversary compromises a tag . ,5 is able to 
create a fake tag   that can fool an honest reader .. We want to prevent ,5 from counterfeiting 
another valid tag that can fool .. Since the adversary has compromised , we assume that the 
adversary knows all the private information of . With this information, ,5 wants to clone a valid 
tag . With this cloned tag, ,5 wants to spoof an honest reader . that is authorized to access . 
Since each RFID tag shares a seed with its authorized reader,  shares a different seed with 
.(which is not known to . Though ,5 knows 22134, however, she cannot derive the shared 
seed between .(and . Therefore, the adversary cannot create the fake tag to fool .. 
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Eavesdropping: ,5 eavesdrops the communication between . and (and later uses this 
information to launch any of the attacks mentioned above. ,5 can learn every information 
exchanged between . and  such as R)1, ), R)1 and ). We assume that ,5 can listen to 
both the tag-to-reader and reader-to-tag communication channels. According to our protocol, ,5 
cannot launch privacy attack as the protocol does not reveal any sort of private information of the 
tag and the reader. Even ,5 fails to track , because the tag replies with a new pseudo random 
number every time it is queried. Thus, ,5 cannot figure out any signature to follow .  
Under our protocol, listening over the communication channels cannot help ,5 to launch a 
cloning attack. ,5 cannot create a fake tag   by learning only the pseudo random numbers 
exchanged between . and . Since ,5 cannot predict R)1 and have no idea about 22134, it is 
impossible for ,5 to clone . As a result, she cannot fool a legitimate reader .. Suppose, ,5 tries 
to impersonate the tag (and we name the fake tag  . This fake tag wants to fool an honest 
reader .(with which (has communicated recently. Now,   will not be able to deceive ., since 
the reader will definitely query with a new R)1 . And   fails to generate - [22134 \
(R)1  R)1(because it has no idea about the 22134. Even (fails to launch a replay 
attack. If   replays with the same response - [22134 \ R)1  R)1] that is learned from 
an earlier authentication session, . will easily identify that it is a fake tag.  
Forward secrecy: Forward secrecy means if anyhow an adversary compromises a tag, 
she will not be able to track down any data previously transmitted by the tag. It means that if ,5 
physically tampers (and learns 22134shared with ., ,5 will not be able to trace the data back 
through past events in which both the reader and the tag were involved. Our protocol ensures 
strong forward secrecy since the seed-update function *  is an irreversible one way hash 
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function. Therefore, by tampering , ,5 cannot realize the former outputs based on the former 
seeds since she cannot derive the previous seeds in the sequence from the current seed. 
3.5.2 Cost analysis 
Our authentication protocol involves one hash function, *  and one pseudo random 
function -'. But the cost depends on the number of execution of the hash function during an 
authentication session between the reader and the tag. Therefore, we determine the cost of our 
protocol on the basis of the computations of '. From the authentication protocol described in 
section 3.3.2, the tag performs the ' twice, first in line 12 and second in line 15. So, the cost 
for our protocols is little higher than the protocols described in [Juels07, Tsudik06, and Weis03] 
which require the tag to perform only one hash function. The additional hash function allows our 
protocol to be serverless and yet avoids exposing the tag’s secret to the reader. In terms of 
efficiency, in the worst case, the reader needs to perform :0: computations, since it has to derive 
- 221" \ R)1  R)1 for each tag " in the contact list. Now, we consider the 
communication cost. Assuming that both reader and the tag ids are of the same length, the 
authentication protocol requires the communication of ( ' :):  (( ' :R)1:) bits, where :): is 
the length of random numbers ) and ), and :R)1: is the length of both the R)1 and the 
R)1 respectively.  
3.6 Additional features 
3.6.1 Ownership transfer 
 Ownership transfer ensures that an authorized reader renounces the authority of a tag and 
a new reader gets the authority to access the tag. Suppose, .(is the current owner of the tag . 
After transferring ownership to another reader .,  responds to . in the same way as it did to 
.. From now on, . has no rights to access . Though ownership transfer issue is dealt with in 
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[Cui07, Tsudik07 and Molnar05], the backend server plays a significant role in those protocols. 
Based on our protocol, we propose two methods of ownership transfer. 
A. o(based ownership transfer: The certification authority (+,) has all the 
responsibility of deploying tags and authorizing readers. A reader obtains its contact list 0(from 
the +, using a secure channel at the beginning of its operation. Whenever the reader . faces the 
need to transfer the ownership of a particular tag to another reader, it informs the +, about the 
change in the access policy along with the ownership information of the tag. Ownership 
information comprises the identifier and the current seed for the particular tag stored in the 
contact list of .. The +, now authenticates the new owner (another reader) and authorizes the 
new owner by updating its contact list with the ownership information. Then the certification 
authority also deletes the ownership information of the tag from the old owner's contact list. For 
example, the /1 and the current 221 of the tag  are its ownership information. The old owner 
. transmits this ownership information to the +, at the time of informing about a change in 
ownership of . CA authorizes . (new owner) with this ownership information and removes 
this information from 0. 
B. Serverless ownership transfer: The prerequisite of this method is reader-to-reader 
secure communication. At the time of the ownership transfer, the old owner . transmits the /1 
and the current 221 of the tag  to the new owner . and then simply removes ownership 
information for  from its contact list 0. However, the old reader can abuse the situation by 
deciding not to delete 221 from his contact list. Therefore, to protect against such vulnerability, 
the new authorized owner . authenticates the tag   as soon as . receives the ownership 
information. This will desynchronize the seed shared between  and the old owner. Therefore, 
even if  . does not remove ownership information for , . will have no valid seed to access  
thereafter. However, the shared seed between . and  will still be synchronized. Once the 
ownership transfer process is completed, the new owner . notifies the +, regarding the update 
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in its new contact list to remain synchronized with the +,. This notification is done through a 
secure channel. 
3.6.2 Scalability  
Scalability means that a reader can find a tag’s identifier with limited computational time 
regardless of the number of tags owned by it. According to our protocol, if the total number of 
tags owned by a reader is , the time complexity of search operation is . Juels and Weis 
proved in [Juels07] that improved randomized hash lock offer strong privacy and security at the 
cost of poor scalability. We entirely comply with their observation and propose a more practical 
way of ensuring scalability with the help of ownership transfer. Our proposal is that each reader 
will have a threshold value . Here  is the maximum number of tags that a reader can have 
access to and   . When a reader’s contact list surpasses the threshold , the reader, called as 
a overloaded reader, wishes to reduce its burden. So, if the overloaded reader has a co-operative 
reader in its vicinity and if the co-operative reader has enough available memory space, the 
overloaded reader will transfer some of its burden to the co-operative reader. 
3.7 Comparison with other protocols 
In this section we compare our protocol with some renowned RFID authentication 
protocols. This comparison is based on the security and privacy properties required for an RFID 
system. The comparison is shown in Table 3.2. 
3.8 Application scenarios 
A. Container recognition in off-site location: Let us consider a case in which a company 
uses RFID system for employee identification, human authentication while entering into safety 
regions, document management, product maintenance and etc. All these services are easily 
ensured with central server based RFID system. But this company faces problem when they have 
to collect their ordered raw material containers from other companies that belong to the off-site  
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Table 3.2: Comparison of authentication protocols based on the security features and other 
additional features 
Protocols Privacy Protection 
Anti-
Tracking 
Anti-
Cloning 
Synchroni-
zation 
DoS 
Resiliency 
Forward 
Secrecy 
Ownership 
Transfer 
Scalability 
Assurance  
Seo-Lee-Kim 
[Seo06A] Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
External 
Intervention Yes 
Seo-Lee-Kim 
[Seo06B]  Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
OSK [Ohkubo03] Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No 
YA-TRAP 
[Tsudik06] Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes 
Av-
Oech[Avoine05] Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes 
RIPP-FS [Conti07] Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Tan-Sheng-Li 
[Tan07] Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Our Protocol Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
locations. This off site location has no connection with the central server. Normally truck drivers 
are dispatched to the other companies to collect container deliveries. But it is a very usual case 
that people employed in this job does not have the capability to ensure that the supplied 
containers are the correct one that were ordered by his company. Moreover it is not possible to 
check each container individually because obviously there are enormous numbers of containers. 
As a result, containers being unchecked, sometimes wrong material are delivered to the 
warehouse. This causes a loss for the particular manufacturing company. Now this problem can 
be easily eliminated by using our serverless protocol provided that the containers are tagged 
objects. The truck driver may have with him his personal PDA, which can act as a reader. 
Reaching the offsite location this reader can easily authenticate the containers and find out 
whether they are the ordered containers or not. This can be easily done as under our protocol, the 
readers can authenticate and communicate with tags without the intervention of central server.  
B. Environmental monitoring: The use of RFID systems in conjunction with highly 
miniaturized sensors will make it possible to observe diverse environmental phenomena. 
Environmental scientists perform diverse research on environment by attaching tags with animals 
and releasing them in the wild again. These attached tags together with our serverless protocol 
can help scientists on their research.  Moreover, sometimes it becomes necessary to regain a 
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tagged animal from the wild for research purpose. In this case our protocol can be very useful as 
readers can track or locate the tagged animal in the wild without the need of server. 
C. Authenticating smart objects usage at construction site: Several research groups 
have been investigating applications of smart objects in outdoor working sites where regular tools 
are augmented for supplementary services. For example, in [Kortuem07] construction drill 
machines are augmented so that usage history can be monitored and usage safety can be ensured 
by appropriate alerts. Such augmentations have direct implications in the business and logistic 
processes of the companies since they use performance record of the workers. Our proposed 
protocol can be applied to such scenarios to authenticate the workers to use the smart tools and to 
enable secure logging of monitoring data locally which ensures their privacy. 
3.9 Summary 
In this chapter, we have suggested a serverless authentication protocol which ensures 
mutual authentication of both the tag and the reader. Our authentication protocol is forward 
secured and shielded against some major attacks, such as tracking, cloning, eavesdropping, 
physical tampering, and DoS. Moreover, we have also proposed ownership transfer mechanism 
which facilitates our protocol to be scalable. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
contribution in the literature that enables serverless protocol to perform ownership transfer. Our 
plan is to devise a robust authentication protocol which will be able to synchronize a tag and its 
legitimate reader even if the adversary desynchronizes them. 
  
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Chapter 4: A Robust RFID Private Authentication Protocol 
4.1 Introduction 
RFID systems have been scrutinized nowadays as one of the emerging technologies in 
pervasive environment. Authentication becomes indispensible in applications where security and 
privacy are major concerns. Besides preventing some major attacks, RFID systems need to be 
able to recover from unexpected conditions during operation. 
Security and privacy aspects should be addressed before mass deployment of RFID tags 
in omnipresent environment. However, conventional security solutions cannot be integrated in 
RFID tags as they have inadequate computation capabilities with extremely limited resources. 
Consequently, research community proposed several authentication protocols [Ahamed08A, 
Conti07, Ohkubo03, Seo06A, and Tsudik06] that are secured against major attack models 
including tracking, cloning, eavesdropping etc. But the complete removal denial of service (DoS) 
attack is almost impossible. This attack causes conflict with the fundamental requirements such as 
availability. An adversary can launch this attack in several strategies against RFID systems. For 
instance, jamming the communication channels with noise can affect availability. However such 
attacks can be detected and mitigated by mechanisms at the physical layer [Sharma03]. In this 
chapter, we focus instead on the solutions to support availability at the protocol level (RFID 
application layer).  
The adversary can attack a tag with numerous queries from a rogue reader that is his 
under control. As a result, the tag is not able to respond to any further query from the legitimate 
reader. In other words, a genuine reader cannot communicate with his legitimate tags. A similar 
attack is also possible on the reader launched by a rogue tag (controlled by the adversary). If the 
reader has to spend a lot of time to verify each tag’s reply, this attack can keep the reader busy all 
the time with some fake responses. If the adversary spends less time on generating those fake 
responses, then the system will eventually be flawed. 
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4.1.1 Desynchronizing attack 
At the protocol level, another class of DoS attack can be possible. We term this attack as 
desynchronizing attack. To provide strong authentication in an RFID system, the reader (or the 
backend server) and the tag have to share secrets. For example, in a symmetric-key setting, both 
the reader and the tag may share keys and other state information. But if the protocol has to 
support privacy protection, the reader (or the backend server) must use some mutable information 
(such as a changing pseudonym) to identify the tag in the absence of fixed identification values. 
The dynamic information has to be synchronized between the reader and the tag to operate the 
system successfully. In this scenario, the adversary can launch the desynchronizing attack by 
breaking this synchronization. For example, due to the radio jamming of the channel between the 
tag and the reader, a communication failure may happen, which may eventually result in 
desynchronizing attack. Therefore RFID authentication protocols should at least figure out some 
methods to detect this attack and recover the system if it is under attack. 
DoS attack is not addressed by most of the authentication protocols because it is not 
possible to cope with all kinds of DoS attacks. YA-TRAP [Tsudik06] is a famous authentication 
protocol that places little burden on the backend server and uses monotonically increasing 
timestamp which makes it secure against tracking but unsecure against DoS attack. Another a 
hash chain based RFID identification protocol is RIPP-FS [Conti07]. Here Conti et al. proposed 
that each tag shares a private symmetric key with the server. After each successful authentication, 
both the tag and the server update the symmetric key to maintain synchronization. RIPP-FS is 
resilient to a specific DoS attack where the adversary attempts to exhaust the hash chain. Another 
lightweight protocol is OSK [Ohkubo03]. Ohkubo et al. proposed that only two hash function is 
sufficient to provide indistinguishability and forward secrecy. But the problem of OSK is that a 
malicious reader may easily desynchronize a tag which results in DoS attack. In [Ahamed08A], 
we proposed two serverless authentication protocols. However, authentication protocol 2 (also 
33 
presented in Chapter 3) is secured against almost all major attacks. But the major flaw of this 
protocol lacks recovery support. 
 In this chapter, we propose a Robust RFID Private Authentication Protocol (Ripair) that 
supports not only security and privacy, but also recovery in RFID systems. The protocol can get 
back the desynchronized tags and readers to their normal state and thus provides robustness.  This 
protocol has been published in [Hoque09B]. 
4.2 System model 
We consider an RFID system consisting of three components: tags, readers and a backend 
server. The tag is a wireless transponder embedded in physical objects for detection and 
prevention of product counterfeiting. The reader is a transceiver they can query tags for 
identification of objects and/or subjects. To protect privacy all data of the tag that may be privacy 
sensitive is stored in the backend server. Conversely each tag contains a limited amount of data to 
prove his legitimacy to the backend server via the reader. The Reader not only interacts with the 
tag but also communicates with backend server to identify the tag. The communication channel 
between the reader and the backend server is assumed to be secured. For simplicity, we presume a 
reader and the backend server to be a single entity and refer it as the reader. An issuer, another 
entity of this model, initializes each tag by writing the necessary information into the tag’s 
memory. 
4.3 The robust RFID private authentication protocol (Ripair) 
In this section we discuss our protocol. Before the description, we present the notations 
and the assumptions for this protocol. 
4.3.1 Notations and assumptions 
Suppose  is the total number of tags in the system. Each tag contains a secret pair 
consisting of a secret number  and an identifier . The tag gets this data from the issuer at the 
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time of deployment. On the other hand, for each tag, the reader has a 3-tuple composed of the 
secret number , the secret number of the last successful session , and the tag identifier . 
On the reader side, a tag  points to all the data associated with the respective tag. All the 
entities of the system have the knowledge of a PRNG, *  that can generate pseudorandom 
number based on its input (seed). In our case, this input (seed) will be the secret number  (or 
sometimes ). Both the reader and the tag also knows about the one way hash function * . 
Initially, the data of the tag are in sync with the data of the reader, and  is equal to its 
corresponding . We also assume that both the reader and the tag have capability of producing 
random numbers that have the properties of a nonce. In other words, the reader and the tag can 
produce nonce. 
4.3.2 Protocol description 
The protocol operates as shown in Figure 4.1. At first, the reader sends a request 
accompanied by a random number   (nonce). Upon receiving the request, the tag computes ) 
with a self produced random number   (nonce). The tag replies with the ) for authenticating 
itself. The  is attached with the response to help the reader to produce the same pseudorandom 
number. Now the reader checks the validity of ) by computing   \    for each tag in 
the database. If the reader finds a match, it can be sure of the validity of the tag. To protect 
privacy, the reader has to mutate the secret number. Therefore the reader updates  with the 
current . To prove own legitimacy the reader has to generate his response that only the tag can 
understand. The reader produces ) by using the next seed in the sequence that is the hashed 
secret number . Then the reader updates the seed with the next seed in the sequence (i.e., 
). If the reader fails to find any match in the first search strategy, he changes the scheme 
of search by replacing the  with the  of each tag in the database. After a successful match, 
the reader has to generates ). In fact, this step of the protocol provides the system robustness to 
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the desynchronizing attack. At this step the system recovers the tag that was desynchronized with 
the reader by some malicious actions happened before. In both the cases, the reader replies with 
the produced ). If ) is not valid at all, the reader simply ignores the message and replies with a 
random number R)1. However, this R)1 keeps the protocol consistent by preventing an 
eavesdropper to acquire any knowledge (success or failure) about this session. 
Reader  Tag 
#     !  #   ! 
Generate  2PQ2   
  Generate  
)    \    
 )   
Use all the entries in the 
database to generate 
   \    for all tags 
and check validity of ),  
if correct: 
  , 
   ,  
)    \   ,  
  ; 
if not correct: 
generate  
  \    
for all tags and check ),  
if correct:  
)    \   ; 
Otherwise:  
ignore the message and 
)  R)1 
  
 )   , generate  
  \    and 
check validity of ),  
if correct:  
    
Figure 4.1: The robust RFID private authentication protocol 
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Finally, it is the tag’s turn to identify the reader by verifying the received ). If the ) is 
valid, the tag updates his secret number accordingly as shown in Figure 4.1. Otherwise the tag 
discards the message. 
4.4 Attack model 
In this chapter, an adversary is denoted as ,5. The adversary can control a number of 
readers and tags. Each reader and each tag controlled by the adversary is denoted as .dand d, 
respectively. .d is unauthorized to have access to any real tags as it is not connected with the 
backend server. Similarly, d is not valid as it has no idea about real  and real . We presume 
that the backend server cannot be compromised otherwise the adversary would get total control 
over the tag database then. We do not take for granted that the adversary has unlimited resources. 
Instead we assume that all the entities such as tags, readers, adversaries, adversarial tags and 
adversarial readers have polynomially bounded resources. 
For this protocol, our assumptions also include that the goal of the adversary is not 
confined to only forging a real tag and making the fake tag (and therewith the fake product) 
indistinguishable from the real one. By hampering the availability (by applying desynchronizing 
attack) the adversary can flawed the system. The adversary ,5 is simply more powerful than a 
passive attacker. Like a passive attacker he can eavesdrop on the both the forward and backward 
channels between a valid reader and a valid tag. However, like an active attacker, ,5 can install a 
rogue reader .d that can communicate with a valid tag. In addition, the adversary can install a fake 
tag d to communicate with a legitimate reader. In both cases the ultimate goal of the adversary is 
to counterfeit a tag with the learned information. Despite of these attacks, the adversary can block 
any channel at any time to fulfill his purpose. The adversary can launch the desynchronizing 
attack by blocking (or jamming) any of the channels at any step of the protocol or by scrambling 
any message passed from one party to another. In case of the protocol presented in Chapter 3, the 
adversary can successfully desynchronized the tag and the reader, if he blocks the forward 
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channel (from the reader to the tag) at line 15 (see section 3.3.2 or Figure 3.1) where the reader 
sends a validation message to the tag. Denial-of-service attacks at the physical layer are out of 
scope of this chapter. 
4.5 Analysis of the protocol 
In this section we analyze our proposed protocol. First we present how our protocol 
provides robustness and recovers the desynchronized tags. Then we focus on security and privacy 
analysis of the protocol. 
4.5.1 Robustness analysis 
In this section, we present a detailed example to explain how Ripair provides robustness. 
After describing a successful tag query, we illustrate how a tag is recovered if the adversary 
launches the desynchronizing attack in the earlier session. In our example, to make analysis 
simple, we demonstrate the interaction between a single tag and the reader. 
Reader  Tag 
#    !  #   ! 
Figure 4.2: Initial states 
Initially, the reader and the tag are both in sync, as shown in Figure 4.2. Now the tag 
responds to authenticate him upon receiving the request from the reader. Since the tag is valid, the 
reader finds a match with an entry in the tag database. Now the reader generates 	 by using 
. To prove himself valid, the reader replies with a valid ). At the same time the reader also 
updates the  and the  with the 
 (=	) and the , respectively. The tag also finds the 
reader valid and updates his  from  to 
 according to the protocol. The subsequent states after 
this successful session are depicted in Figure 4.3. 
Now the adversary can break the synchronicity in final communication pass of the 
protocol where the tag waits for ) from the reader. Suppose the aforementioned tag again 
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interacts with the reader after a while. Every message but the final one, for instance, is effectively 
received. The very last message containing ) is damaged or lost due to some malicious actions 
of the adversary. Since the tag cannot update his secret number, he becomes desynchronized with 
the real reader. The internal states of the reader and the tag after this unsuccessful session are 
shown in Figure 4.4. 
Reader  Tag 
# 
   !  # 
  ! 
Figure 4.3: States after the successful interaction 
Now if this tag again comes to vicinity of the reader, the tag starts interaction with the 
reader. However, the tag still has # 
  ! as his internal data. Now the reader fails to find any 
match with the received response as he tries to validate with all the ’s in the database where the 
 for this particular tag is |. On the contrary, the tag has used 
 to generate his response. The 
reader further continues the search with the previous secret numbers, ’s. Now the search will 
be fruitful since the  for the particular tag is still 
. Hence the reader concludes that the tag 
is valid that was desynchronized in some earlier session. 
Reader  Tag 
# | 
  !  # 
  ! 
Figure 4.4: States after the unsuccessful session 
To synchronize both the entities again, the reader takes a prominent step by sending the 
valid message without doing any update in the database. When the tag receives this message, he 
successfully verifies the originality of the reader and therewith updates the secret number (from 

 to |) as well. Thus the robust protocol recovers the system from out of order state. After 
recovery, the states are shown in Figure 4.5. 
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Reader  Tag 
# | 
  !  # |  ! 
Figure 4.5: State after recovery 
4.5.2 Security and privacy analysis 
In chapter 2, we have mentioned the six elements of safety ring which must be ensured 
by an authentication protocol in order to keep an RFID system secured and protected. In this 
section, we explain how Ripair defends the RFID system against those six major attacks and 
keeps the system within the safety ring. 
Privacy Protection: Users carrying various tagged items do not want to hamper their 
privacy. If an adversary comes by any private information of the tag, by querying or 
eavesdropping, he may cause several vulnerabilities to the owner’s day to day life. Our protocol 
protects user’s privacy strongly. According to Ripair, a tag never sends his own  to anyone, not 
even to the authorized reader. The tag sends his responses in disguise so that only an authorized 
reader can identify the tag. 
Prevent Tracking: If a tag replies with a constant response (e.g., plain ID or even 
obfuscated message) each time he is queried, this constant response becomes a signature for the 
particular tag. So the potential problem is that the adversary can establish a link between the 
responses and the tag and therewith the owner of the tagged object which ultimately leads to 
tracking. In order to prevent clandestine physical tracking, each entity’s response must be 
scrambled. Our protocol is secured against such kind of tracking attack. In Ripair, each entity 
replies with a distinct response in every session since random numbers ( and ) are involved 
within each computation of the validation messages () and )). 
Prevent Cloning: To launch this attack, an active adversary queries a real tag and obtains 
the response. By placing this response in a fake tag d, the adversary ,5 attempts to counterfeit the 
real tag. Now the attacker becomes successful in his attempts if he can deceive a legitimate 
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reader. In other words, the real reader fails to distinguish the genuine tag from the fake one. 
According to Ripair, whenever an adversary ,5 queries a real tag, he receives a distinct response 
each time because of the inclusion of random numbers in the response. Thus the protocol thwarts 
tag counterfeiting. 
Ensure Forward Secrecy: Forward secrecy means that an adversary will not be able to 
realize any previous output transmitted by a entity even if he compromises the entity. Our 
protocol ensures forward secrecy. The secret number , shared between the tag and the reader, is 
updated each time using irreversible one way hash function * . After compromising a valid 
entity (the reader or the tag),(,5 cannot realize the earlier responses by just learning the secret 
number. Because those responses are based on the former secret numbers and he cannot derive 
the former secret numbers from the current one. 
Lessen Susceptibility to Replay Attack: In order to launch this attack, the adversary 
eavesdrops on both the communication channels between the tag and the reader. Thus ,5 can learn 
all the challenges and the responses between the legitimate tag and the legitimate reader, and later 
uses these data to create a fake tag (reader) in order to deceive an honest reader (tag). But in order 
to deceive a legitimate reader (tag), the fake tag d (fake reader .d) has to generate a valid 
response. In case of our protocol, this is impossible since two distinct random numbers are 
involved in each session. Therefore Ripair is not susceptible to replay attack. 
Deal with Denial of Service: In this attack, the adversary wants neither to derive any 
information nor to impersonate a tag or a reader. Rather the main target is to ensure that a valid 
reader cannot access his authorized tags. To launch a DoS attack, ,5 can adopt several means. 
Though it is not possible to cope with denial of service due to all possible ways, we focus on 
some of those that our protocol can prevent. Jamming the channels may cause DoS. This problem 
exacerbates when the backend server and the tag shares a secret key that has to be synchronized 
after each regular query. Even distorted or damaged message may cause DoS. Certainly, our 
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proposed protocol is vulnerable to above mentioned means. However, even after being 
desynchronized, the protocol can recover the RFID tags to the normal state. 
4.6 Summary 
Widespread deployment of RFID systems depend on the strength of security against 
major attacks, protection of private data, and recovery from unanticipated circumstances during 
the operations. Each of the elements of the “Safety Ring” has to be ensured to keep the system 
secured. In order to cope with these demands, we have presented a robust RFID private 
authentication protocol (Ripair) in this chapter. How this protocol recovers the system has been 
presented in the robustness analysis. In addition, security analysis establishes that the protocol 
keeps the system secured by ensuring the safety ring. Study of other issues of DoS and making 
the system more robust against those means are still open issues. 
  
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Chapter 5: ERAP: An ECC Based RFID Authentication 
Protocol 
5.1 Introduction 
Supply chain management can be referred to as a successful application of RFID 
technology. It is an enabling technology that has the potential of helping the retailers to provide 
the right product at the right place at the right time, thus maximizing sales and profit. RFID helps 
to uniquely identify each container, pallet, case and item being manufactured, shipped and sold.  
Thus RFID provides the building blocks for increased visibility throughout the supply chain. 
Another important application of RFID systems is to detect counterfeit products. In 
supply chain, product authentication provides great opportunity to find illicit trade and business 
by identifying counterfeit products.  Counterfeiting is a rapidly growing problem that affects a 
great number of industries and harms societies in many ways. Therefore new technologies must 
be put in place to prevent the counterfeit threat. And RFID technology has been identified as one 
of the major anti-counterfeiting technology.  
Anti-counterfeiting problem can also be rephrased as authentication problem. In order to 
avoid counterfeiting, the adversary must not be able to clone any RFID tag. Moreover retrieving 
the tag’s secret information by attacking the authentication protocol between the reader and the 
tag has to be infeasible with respect to the resources of the adversary. Protection against cloning 
at the physical level is achieved by using physical countermeasures [Tuyls06] and protection 
against passive or active attack on the protocol level is provided by using cryptographic functions 
such as secure authentication protocols.  
Public key cryptography (PKC) offers an attractive solution to the counterfeiting 
problem. But most of the previous works on RFID security consider only symmetric-key 
algorithms such as AES [Feldhofer04]. But it is still not clear whether public key algorithms can 
be implemented on small constrained devices such as RFID tags and can comply with memory, 
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area, performance and power requirements for these applications. However in [Batina06A], the 
authors investigate PKC based identification protocols that are useful for anti counterfeiting 
applications.  
In comparison with symmetric key based identification schemes, public key cryptography 
is more flexible requiring no complicated pre-distributed key and pair wise key sharing 
negotiation. The RSA algorithm is definitely the most popular in public key cryptography. 
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is relatively a new family of public key algorithms that can 
provide the same level of security with shorter key lengths. Depending upon the environment and 
the application in which it is used, improved performance can be achieved.  
It is a common belief in research community that public key cryptography (PKC), such as 
RSA and ECC, is not practical because the required computational complexity is prohibitive for 
the devices with limited computational capability and extremely constrained memory space. But 
some recent progress in ECC and RSA implementation shows that public key cryptography is 
feasible for small sensor devices and RFID tags. Recently a few papers [Tuyls06, 
Wolkerstorfer05, Hein09] discuss the feasibility of ECC based PKC on RFID tags. Here we adopt 
the belief that ECC based public key algorithms are feasible for RFID identification or 
authentication. In this chapter, we propose an ECC based RFID authentication protocol (ERAP) 
which is secure against some major passive and active attacks. Our proposed protocol is a mutual 
offline authentication protocol which ensures that the tag and the reader authenticate each other 
prior to any data exchange. Since it is a mutual authentication protocol, the tag releases own data 
to only an authenticated reader and the reader can access only those tags for which the reader is 
authorized. This protocol has been published in [Ahamed08B]. 
5.2 Technical preliminaries 
Since our protocol is based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), we first focus on 
some preliminaries of ECC.  
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5.2.1 ECC preliminaries 
The foundation of ECC based encryption-decryption scheme and digital signature scheme 
is an elliptic curve (). The domain parameters of an elliptic curve scheme describe an elliptic 
curve  defined over a finite field . 
Definition 1. A set   8 P .  R   )  of domain parameters consists of:  
1. The field size P. 
2. . (field representation) is an indication of the representation used for the 
elements of . 
3. If the elliptic curve is randomly generated in accordance with [ANSIX9.62], a 
seed  is used. The seed length should be at least160 bits [Johnson01]. 
4. Two coefficients R  K  define the equation of  over . 
5. A finite point   8   c K  where   c K .  has prime order and 
is called base point. 
6. The order ) of the point , with ) ! 	f and ) ! P . 
7. The co-factor  8 ). ◊ 
Detail descriptions of domain parameters are provided in [ANSIX9.62, Johnson01 and 
Hankerson04]. There are security risks associated with multiple users sharing the same elliptic 
curve domain parameters [ANSIX9.62]. Detail security considerations are described in the 
standard X9.62 [ANSIX9.62].  
Like any other public-key crypto, ECC is based on a key pair– a private key and a public 
key. The private key is statistically unique and unpredictable integer 1 K L& )   &M. And the 
corresponding public key is the scalar multiplication of 1 and , i.e., ¡ 8 1. Thus the key pair 
¡ 1 is associated with the domain parameters  of the elliptic curve.  
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5.2.2 System model 
A model for our RFID authentication system has two direct components: tags  and 
readers .. Tags are wireless transponder embedded in physical objects for detection and 
prevention of product counterfeiting. Readers are transceivers— they can query tags for 
identification of objects and/or subjects. A Certification Authority +, is an indirect party that is 
trusted by all the tags and the readers. +, is also assumed not to be compromised. However, +, 
is not mentioned as a direct component of our RFID system since an offline authentication 
scheme requires no direct participation of a backend server. +,’s mere function is to deploy all 
the tags as well as to authorize the readers. In other words, +, performs only at the time of the 
deployment of the system. That’s why +, is not included as a direct component.  
Since our protocol is based on ECC, each party (the +,, the tag and the reader) has to be 
capable of performing calculation based on ECC. The certification authority generates the elliptic 
curve domain parameters as well as the key pairs in accordance with X9.62 [ANSIX9.62]. To 
thwart the attacks of an adversary and to enhance the system security, we propose to select a 
unique elliptic curve for each RFID tag in the system.  
Definition 2. A Certification Authority +,, the indispensable and indirect component of 
the RFID system, is equipped with four algorithms:  
1. A domain parameter generation algorithm that generates a set  of domain 
parameters for each tag in the system. This algorithm randomly selects an elliptic 
curve over  according to X9.62. 
2. A domain parameter validation algorithm that checks the validity of the set  
before moving on to the next task. 
3. A key generation algorithm that takes the set  as input and generates a key pair 
¡ 1, where 1 is the private key and ¡ is the corresponding public key. A key 
pair is generated for each elliptic curve, i.e., for each tag. 
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4. A public key validation algorithm that takes the set  and the associated public 
key ¡ as inputs and checks the validity of ¡ for the given set of .◊ 
An RFID tag  is the smallest of all the components of our system. Each tag is capable of 
performing elliptic curve computation along with modular computation. During the deployment, 
each tag  receives a unique identifier , a unique set of domain parameters  and the 
associated private key 1 from +, (see Figure 5.1(a)). The certification authority writes all the 
data into the ROM (EEPROM) memory of the tag. These data are secret for each tag. We assume 
that a tag never reveals these secret data to any reader, not even to any other tag of the system. 
But the adversary is capable of learning these secret data by launching some hardware based 
physical attack. But in this chapter, we do not consider any hardware based physical attack. 
The other direct component of our system is the RFID reader .. Since a reader can 
perform extensive computation than a tag, the reader has the major role in our authentication 
protocol. During the deployment, each reader . receives a contact list ¢ from +, after . 
authenticates itself to +, (see Figure 5.1(b)). The contact list contains the identifying information 
of each tag  that . is authorized to access. We also assume that the communication between . 
and +, is performed via a secure channel.  
Definition 3. If a reader . is to be authorized to access a set of tags 	 
 H  £, then 
after authenticating to +, the reader . receives a contact list ¢ as follows:  
¢ 8 G +2|(is(the(identi@ier(of((Cnd(  
((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((+2 (is(the(certi@icCte(of(¦ &  /  §I  
where, a certificate +2 of the tag  is  
+2 8 G ¡|(is(the(set(of(do¨Cin(©CrC¨eters(of(¦  
((((((((((((((((((((¡(is(the(©ª«ic(¬e­(of(I ◊ 
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Figure 5.1: (a) Identifying and secret information of Tag nm received from o  
(b) The contact list u of Reader l received from o 
In our system, a certificate of a tag has the same content like ECC based public key 
cryptography. In public key cryptography, the certificate of a party is available and easily 
accessible to other party that wants to communicate with the former. But in our system, the 
availability and the accessibility of a tag’s certificate are restricted. Here the certificate of a tag is 
accessible only to the reader that has access to the tag.  
5.2.3 Attack model 
One of the goals of an adversary in any RFID system is to counterfeit a real tag such that 
the fake tag can only be distinguished from the real one with small probability. Evidently, this 
fake tag can let a fake product to be identified as a legitimate one just by attaching the fake tag to 
the fake product. In ERAP, an adversary is denoted as ,5. The adversary can control a number of 
readers and tags. Each reader and tag controlled by the adversary are denoted as .d and d, 
respectively. .d is unauthorized to have access to any real tags as it has no information of the 
contact list of the real reader .. Similarly, d is not valid as it does not have secret and identifying 
.
.
.
(b)
(a)
parameter D2
Qγparameter DγIDγ
Q2ID2
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information of a valid tag. In addition, we assume that the adversary, the adversarial reader, and 
the adversarial tag have polynomially bounded resources. 
We assume that ,5 is more powerful than a passive attacker. In addition to eavesdropping 
(like a passive attacker) on the both channels between a valid reader and a valid tag, the adversary 
can install a rogue reader .d (like an active attacker) that can communicate with the valid tag. 
Besides, the adversary can install a fake tag d to communicate with an legitimate reader. In both 
cases the ultimate goal of the adversary is to counterfeit a tag with the learned information. In 
addition, the adversary can launch physical attacks. However, the hardware based defenses 
against physical attacks are beyond the scope of this chapter. 
5.3 Details of ERAP 
A mutual authentication protocol enables communicating parties (a reader and a tag) to 
satisfy them mutually about each other’s identity. A challenge-response based protocol offers 
both the parties (in our case, the reader and the tag) to generate a challenge for the other party to 
respond to. Each party proves own legitimacy by sending the accurate response to the other party. 
In an offline authentication protocol, the authentication is solely performed by a reader and a tag 
without any direct involvement of the backend server (like the certification authority). ERAP is a 
mutual challenge-response based offline authentication protocol. The protocol includes the 
following set of algorithms and definitions:  
1. ®¯ is a random number generated by the reader .. It is the challenge from the reader 
to the tag . 
2. ®3  is a random number generated by the tag . It is the challenge from the tag to the 
reader. 
3. ®¯  ®3 # ) [Hankerson04], where ) is the order of the point  in ECC (see section 
5.2.1). 
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4. °A±=²CO ³ j ´l N yn hn. This algorithm is executed by the tag . The 
arguments are the domain parameter , the associated private key 1 and the 
challenge ®¯ received from the reader .. The algorithm returns the tag’s response as 
an ordered pair 3  3 that  transmits to .. 
5. µ=A;B­²CO ³ ¶ yn hn N ·. The reader . executes this algorithm after receiving 
the response 3  3 from the tag . It takes the domain parameters , the 
corresponding public key ¡ and the received response 3  3 as input. It verifies 
whether the response of the tag is accurate or not. This algorithm outputs ¸, where 
¸ K G,¹¹2º .22¹I. 
6. °A±=»=C<=AO ³ ¶ ´n N yl hl. This algorithm is executed by . to determine 
the reader’s response ¯  ¯ to the received challenge ®3  from the tag , given that 
 is the set of domain parameters and ¡ is the corresponding public key. 
7. µ=A;B­»=C<=AO ³ j yl hl N ·. This is analogous to µ=A;B­²C* algorithm 
except that it is executed by the tag upon receiving the response ¯  ¯ from the 
reader. The output of this algorithm is ¸, where ¸ K G,¹¹2º .22¹I. 
The complete authentication scheme is presented in Figure 5.2. Since it is a mutual 
authentication protocol, we will describe the protocol into two steps: one is “the tag authenticates 
itself to the reader” and the other is “the reader authenticates itself to the tag”. 
5.3.1 Step1:The tag authenticates itself to the reader 
At the beginning of the protocol, the reader . generates a random number ®¯ and 
transmits it as a challenge to the tag . Now it is the time for the tag to prove its identity. The tag 
executes °A±=²C* (see Figure 5.3) and replies to . with the response 3  3.  
In step 1, the reader . plays the role of the verifier. The reader executes µ=A;B­²C* (see 
Figure 5.4) to verify the received response from the tag. . accepts the tag  as valid if:  
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¼ +2 K ¢(Eª¥¤(?¤C?((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
µ=A;B­²C ¡ 3  3(C¥¥=©?E(?¤=(A=E©>E=*  
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for each  +2 K ¢ 
       ¸ S8 µ=A;B­²C ¡ 3  3 
       if ¸ 8 ,¹¹2º21 then 
               R½(/(bR¾/1 
               
¯  ¯ S8 (°A±=»=C<=A ¡ ®3 
        else 
                R½(/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(bR¾/1 
                
¯  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if ¸ 8 ,¹¹2º21 then 
         .2R12(/(bR¾/1 
else 
         .2R12(/()`(bR¾/1 
Figure 5.2: Overview of the ERAP 
Step 1 is based on Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA). In fact it is quite similar to Elliptic 
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). A digital signature offers data integrity along with 
authentication and non-repudiation. But our concern is the authentication feature of a digital 
signature. In this way the prover (in step 1, the tag) can prove own identity to the verifier (in step 
1, the reader). Here ProveTag(.) is the signature generation algorithm and VerifyTag(.) is the 
signature verification algorithm. Though ProveTag(.) and VerifyTag(.) are quite similar to the 
signature generation and verification algorithms of ECDSA, there are subtle dissimilarity. Instead 
of the message digest [Hankerson04], both the algorithms use the challenge generated by the 
reader. The proof that the verification algorithm works is given in section 5.3.3. 
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Algorithm 1. ProveTag 
Input: Domain Parameters  8 P .  R   ) , private key 1 
and a challenge ®¯ 
Output: Response 3  3, an ordered pair based on ®¯ 
1. Select a random integer  K L& )   &M. 
2. Compute  8  and convert the field element ¿ to integer À¿. 
3. Compute 3 8 À¿(¨<(). If 3 8 Á, goto step 1. 
4. Compute 3 8 Â	®¯  13(¨<(). If 3 8 Á, goto step 1. 
5. Return 3  3. 
Figure 5.3: Algorithm 1 (ProveTag) 
Algorithm 2. VerifyTag 
Input: Domain Parameters  8 P .  R   ) , public key ¡ 
and received response 3  3 based on ®¯ 
Output: Acceptance or rejection of the response. 
1. Verify that 3 K L& )   &M and 3 K L& )   &M.  
If any verification fails, then 
     Return (Reject the response). 
2. Compute Ã 8 3Â	(¨<(). 
3. Compute Q	 8 ®¯Ã(¨<() and Q
 8 3Ã(¨<(). 
4. Compute  8 Q	  Q
¡.  
If  8 Ä, then 
     Return (Reject the response). 
5. Convert ¿Å to integer À¿Å and compute b 8 À¿Å (¨<(). 
6. If b 8 3, then Return (Accept the response); 
Else Return (Reject the response). 
Figure 5.4: Algorithm 2 (VerifyTag) 
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5.3.2 Step2: The reader authenticates itself to the tag 
During step 1, in addition to the response 3  3, the tag  sends a new challenge ®3  for 
the reader .. Now it is the reader’s turn to prove itself to the tag. If the reader finds the validity of 
the purported response of , the reader produces a response ¯  ¯ to be sent to the tag. 
Otherwise . generates two different random numbers as the response. To generate a valid 
response the reader executes °A±=»=C<=A*  (see Figure 5.5) using the certificate of the tag. The 
seed parameter  (see section 5.2.1) plays a significant role to generate the response. Its length 
makes the response hard to be forged.  
Upon receiving the response from the reader, the tag verifies ¯  ¯ by using 
µ=A;B­»=C<=A*  (see Figure 5.6) to ascertain that the other entity is the legitimate reader. With 
this step, ERAP terminates. In the step 2, the tag  does not have to search exhaustively. One 
execution of µ=A;B­»=C<=A*  is enough for  to figure out the validity of the reader. 
5.3.3 Proof of the verification algorithms 
Proof that ÆUWÇ^ÈÉXT*  works. If the response 3  3 against the challenge ®¯ is 
indeed generated by the legitimate tag, then we can get 3 8 Â	®¯  13¨<(). From the 
equation we obtain,  
 Ê 3Â	®¯  13 Ê 3Â	®¯  3Â	31  
(((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((Ê Ã®¯  Ã31  
(((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((Ê Q	  Q
1(((((((((((¨<()  
Now in µ=A;B­²C* , a point  8 Q	  Q
¡ is generated. If the reader is authorized to 
access to the tag , then the reader’s contact list contains the valid  and the valid ¡ to generate 
. So  
 8 Q	  Q
¡ 8 Q	  Q
1 8  8   
and therefore b 8 3 as required. 
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Algorithm 3. ProveReader 
Input: Domain Parameters  8 P .  R   ) , public key ¡ 
and a challenge ®3  
Output: Response ¯  ¯, an ordered pair based on ®3  
1. Select a random integer  K L& )   &M. 
2. Compute  8 ¡ and convert the field element ¿ to integer À¿. 
3. Compute ¯ 8 À¿(¨<(). If ¯ 8 Á, goto step 1. 
4. Compute ¯ 8 
Â	®3  ¯ ¨<(). If ¯ 8 Á, goto step 1. 
5. Return ¯  ¯. 
Figure 5.5: Algorithm 3 (ProveReader) 
Algorithm 4. VerifyReader 
Input: Domain Parameters  8 P .  R   ) , private key 1 
and received response ¯  ¯ based on ®3  
Output: Acceptance or rejection of the response. 
1. Verify that ¯ K L& )   &M and ¯ K L& )   &M*  
If any verification fails, then  
    Return (Reject the response). 
2. Compute Ã 8 ¯Â	(¨<(). 
3. Compute Q	 8 ®3Ã(¨<() and Q
 8 ¯ Ã(¨<(). 
4. Compute  8 Q	  Q
1*  
If  8 Ä, then  
     Return (Reject the response). 
5. Convert ¿Å to integer À¿Å and compute b 8 À¿Å (¨<(). 
6. If b 8 ¯ , then Return (Accept the response); 
Else Return (Reject the response). 
Figure 5.6: Algorithm 4 (VerifyReader) 
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Proof that ÆUWÇ^ÈËUXÌUW*  works. If the response ¯  ¯ against the challenge ®3  is 
certainly produced by the authorized reader, then ¯ 8 Â	®3  ¯ ¨<(). From this 
equation we obtain,  
 Ê ¯Â	®3  ¯  Ê ¯Â	®3  ¯Â	¯   
(((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((Ê Ã®3  Ã¯   
(((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((Ê Q	  Q
(((((((((((¨<()  
The tag  generates a point  8 Q	  Q
1 according to µ=A;B­»=C<=A* . Since the 
tag has its own domain parameters and private key, we can say the point  is 
 8 Q	  Q
1 8 1 8 ¡ 8   
and as a result b 8 ¯ , as required. 
5.4 Security and privacy analysis of the protocol 
In this section, we describe a number of attacks that an RFID system faces. This is 
followed by the counter measures an RFID system should take. Then, we explain how ERAP 
defends the system against these attacks. A legitimate reader and a legitimate tag are denoted by 
. and , respectively.  
Privacy protection. According to [Juels06], RFID gives rise to two major privacy 
concerns: covert tracking and inventorying.  
A. Tracking. As RFID tags respond to any reader’s challenges, tags can provide a ready 
vehicle for tracking by responding with a constant reply, for example, a fixed serial number. This 
privacy problem exacerbates when any personal information is combined with the tag’s serial 
number. To prevent clandestine physical tracking, a tag’s response must be scrambled. Moreover, 
the response must not carry any personal data. 
The adversary ,5 can launch an attack to track the tag  by controlling a rogue reader .d. 
This is an active attack initiated by ,5 to track . However, a passive attacker can even harvest 
enough information by eavesdropping so that the attacker is able to track . If repeatedly 
challenging  with a same value yields a consistent reply, then ,5 can distinguish the tag from 
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other RFID tags since the consistent reply becomes a signature of . Therefore .d starts querying 
 with a fixed ®¯ learned from any previous session of our protocol. But a random integer  used 
in °A±=²C*  makes the responses of  random to .d, even though .d reuses the same ®¯. Thus, 
°A±=²C*  thwarts the physical tracking of a tag. 
B. Inventorying. In some protocols, a tag’s response contains unique serial number as 
well as the information of the product that the tag is attached to. People carrying such tags are 
subject to secret inventorying. A rogue reader comes to know about the consumer’s personal 
information. To protect the consumer’s interests, a protocol must ensure that the tag’s response 
contains no product information. Moreover tags should reply in disguise so that only authorized 
readers can identify them. 
ERAP prevents secret inventorying attack since ERAP does not exploit any intrinsic 
information, like the tag’s . Rather the protocol uses domain parameters, private and public 
keys, and the challenges and responses between the tag and the reader. Thus, ERAP protects user 
privacy. 
Cloning. Now we consider the cloning attack launch by an active attacker. To perform 
this attack, ,5 first queries the tag  and obtains a response from the tag. By writing this response 
in a fake tag d, the adversary attempts to counterfeit the real tag. ,5 becomes successful in her 
attempts if she can deceive a legitimate reader ., i.e. . fails to distinguish d from . 
According to our protocol, whenever ,5 challenges the tag  , she gets a different 
response each time due to the random integer  in °A±=²C* . Now suppose ,5 writes this 
response in d. But d  frustrates the adversary as it fails to fool the valid . because the adversary 
cannot predict the challenge ®¯ that . will use to query the tag d. Therefore ,5 cannot obtain the 
valid response from the valid tag at the time of counterfeiting . Hence we can say that ERAP is 
secured against the cloning attack.  
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Eavesdropping. So far we consider the active attacks that ,5 can launch in our RFID 
system. Having the capability of a passive attacker, the adversary can eavesdrop on both the 
channels between the reader and the tag. Therefore, ,5 learns the challenges and the responses 
between . and , and later uses these learned data to launch any of the above mentioned attacks.  
According to our protocol, ,5 cannot track  because  replies with a different response 
each time it is queried, even if the same ®¯ is reused. Even ,5 fails to get any inventory 
information as ERAP does not reveal any personal and/or product related information. Moreover, 
ERAP prevents ,5 from launching a cloning attack by eavesdropping. Suppose the adversary tries 
to impersonate the tag  with a fake tag d and she wants to fool an honest reader . with which  
has communicated recently. To deceive ., d has to generate a valid response. But since each time 
. generates a new challenge ® ¯  (not used before), so d fails to generate a valid response 3  3 . 
Therefore eavesdropping cannot help the adversary to attack the system. 
Physical attack. Physical attack means ,5 compromises either the reader . or the tag . 
We consider each case. Our assumptions include that once ,5 compromises . or , she learns 
everything about the reader or the tag. However, here we do not address hardware based physical 
attack in this chapter.  
A.  compromises l. When ,5 compromises the reader, she gains access to the contact 
list ¢ of the reader. Therefore, the adversarial reader .d can successfully impersonate . and 
communicate with the tags that the reader . has access to. Suppose ¢ has the identifying 
information of the tag  and ,5 wants to counterfeit  denoted as d. The adversary succeeds in her 
attempt if d is able to fool another legitimate reader . that is also authorized to access . But 
under our scheme, counterfeiting a tag and thereby deceiving a valid reader are possible if ,5 
succeeds to recover the private key 1 of the tag by knowing the tag’s public key ¡. This problem 
of recovering the private key with the knowledge of the public key is known as Elliptic Curve 
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Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) [ANSIX9.62]. Our adversary cannot be resolved the 
problem because of the polynomially bounded resources. Therefore ,5 fails to counterfeit . 
B.  compromises n. Whenever ,5 compromises , she learns about the domain 
parameters  and the private key 1 of the tag. As a result, the adversarial tag d  can effectively 
impersonate the tag . Now with this information ,5 wants to clone another valid tag  and with 
this cloned tag ,5 wants to cheat an honest reader . that is authorized to access . Under our 
protocol, knowing the  and 1 of the tag  does not help ,5 to clone . Since the tag  receives 
uniquely different domain parameters  and private key 1 from +,, ,5 cannot recover the 
information of this tag  by compromising only . As a result, ,5 fails to create a fake tag to fool 
the reader .. 
5.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we have presented an RFID authentication protocol which is entirely 
based on Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). It is a better choice than RSA because ECC can 
provide security similar to RSA, but with shorter key lengths. Our proposed ECC based 
authentication scheme can be used to solve product counterfeiting problem which has 
experienced a steep increase in recent years. This protocol is a mutual authentication protocol 
since it provides reader-to-tag and tag-to-reader authentication. According to security and privacy 
analysis of this protocol, we can conclude that it ensures security and protects privacy of the 
RFID system against common major attacks.  
  
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Chapter 6: An Efficient Anonymous Private Authentication 
Protocol 
6.1 Introduction 
RFID systems have been studied actively and frequently in pervasive computing 
environments for last few years. The inherent capability of precise and reliable identification 
attracts RFID systems in the area of tracking applications. This potentiality, however, can put 
individual privacy at a risk. A threat to consumer privacy is one of the major obstacles in the 
widespread deployment of RFID systems. A field trial of RFID embedded loyalty cards in Europe 
was cancelled due to consumer protest over privacy concerns [Caspian04]. Strong authentication 
can be a solution to the privacy problem. One party (prover) has to prove its own identity to 
another party (verifier) in such way that an adversary can neither identify nor track the party 
(prover). In this chapter we will consider only one way authentication where the tag has to 
authenticate itself to the backend server via the reader. Here the tag is the prover and the reader is 
the verifier. To address the privacy problem, the tag has to obfuscate its identity from 
eavesdroppers in such a way that only the valid reader can understand and identify the tag. 
Encrypting the tag’s message can protect its privacy. However, this technique cannot provide any 
hint to the reader about the key that the tag is using to encrypt its message. Therefore the reader 
has to search among a set of candidate keys until it finds the right key that correctly decrypts the 
tag’s message. As a result, the reader becomes inefficient in terms of identifying a single tag since 
it has to search a number of keys. This problem is exacerbated when the number of tags in the 
system increases. 
Several private authentication schemes proposed in [Juels07, Ohkubo03, and Weis03] 
provide strong privacy at the cost of the search complexity on the reader’s side. Under these 
protocols, the workload of the reader increases linearly with the number of tags in the system. In 
other words, the search complexity is , where  is the total number of tags in the system. 
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These approaches become infeasible in some applications, such as tracking each product at every 
stage of supply chain management or automated display of flight information on smart tickets, 
where there is a huge of number of tags in the system. Molnar and Wagner [Molnar04] first 
proposed a tree based hash protocol for RFID systems to reduce the search complexity of the 
reader from  to Í , where ¸ is the branching factor at each level of the tree. The tag 
has to always perform Í  encryptions for every authentication. However, for authenticating a 
single tag, the worst case complexity of the reader is reduced to ¸ Í . But this approach 
achieves better scalability at the cost of some privacy loss of the tags [Nohl06]. Despite the 
privacy loss, this protocol has been held in great consideration by the RFID community because 
this is the first private authentication protocol that reduces the complexity of the reader. In fact, 
this is the only protocol so far that can be practically deployed in large scale applications. 
Therefore, improving the tradeoff between scalability and privacy of RFID systems has a great 
significance in reality. In [Buttyan06], the authors proposed a modified version of the tree based 
scheme where the branching factors are different at the different levels of the tree. This approach 
improves privacy protection. The authors also propose an algorithm to determine the optimal key 
tree for a given number of tags. Later Avoine et al. [Avoine07] proposed a group based private 
authentication scheme that improves the tradeoff between scalability and privacy by dividing the 
tags into a number of groups. The reader’s complexity is cut down to §, where § is the number of 
groups in the system. In other words, the reader has to search through § keys to find out the 
correct key. A benefit of this approach is that the tag has to perform only two encryptions for 
every authentication. In addition, this approach provides significant improvement in privacy 
protection. A serious limitation of this protocol is that whenever any tag is compromised (the 
group key and the tag’s key become known to the adversary), all other tags of the same group 
lose their complete privacy. The level of privacy provided by the scheme decreases as more and 
more tags are compromised.  
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In this chapter, we propose a group based anonymous private authentication protocol 
(AnonPri) that provides higher level of privacy than the above mention group based scheme and 
achieves better efficiency than the approaches that prompt the reader to perform an exhaustive 
search. 
6.2 Privacy in RFID Systems 
So far several protocols have been proposed through which a tag obfuscates its identity 
while authenticating itself to an authorized reader, so that the tag can protect its privacy (and 
thereby consumer’s privacy) from a rogue reader. To provide strong privacy, these protocols 
increase the complexity of the reader (some protocols increase the complexity of the tag, too). 
Thus a tradeoff arises between privacy and scalability of RFID systems. 
6.2.1 Privacy vs. Scalability 
Ensuring strong privacy imposes a higher complexity on the reader. Conversely, 
improving efficiency may hamper some privacy. In this chapter we focus on this major problem 
of between privacy and scalability of RFID systems.  
Public key cryptography would be a better candidate to solve the problem between 
privacy and scalability. In this approach, the tag would encrypt its message using the public key 
of the reader so that only the real reader would be able to decrypt the message and identify the 
tag. But public key encryption is too expensive for low cost tags. In this chapter we consider the 
low cost tags which are capable of doing symmetric key encryption, in which keys are shared 
between the tag and the legitimate readers. 
First, we outline how the tree based hash protocol provides scalability but sacrifice some 
privacy. Then, we describe how the group based protocol provides improved scalability as well as 
a higher level of privacy. Finally, we point out the privacy problem of this group based protocol. 
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Tree based hash protocol. The tree based hash protocol proposed by Molnar and 
Wagner [Molnar04] reduces the reader’s complexity from  to Í . Tags are 
organized in a secret key tree where each tag is assigned to a leaf of the tree. Secret keys are 
associated with each branch of the tree. Each tag (each leaf) receives all the secret keys along the 
path from the root to itself. If the tree has ¢ levels, each tag stores ¢ keys. The authors [Molnar04] 
proposed the key tree as a balanced tree. So if the branching factor is ¸, the Í  will be equal 
to ¢. Each tag has only one key that is not shared with any other tag of the system. Figure 6.1 
shows a balanced key tree with  8 Î and ¸ 8 .  
 
Figure 6.1: A secret key tree for the tree based hash protocol with Ï 8 Ð and · 8 k 
According to this protocol, the reader queries a tag with a nonce ). Upon the reception 
of the nonce from the reader, the tag generates another nonce )Ñ and replies to the reader with 
)Ñ  ÒÓ  )  )Ñ ÒÓÒx  )  )Ñ H  ÒÓÒxHÒÔ  )  )Ñ 
where each ¾ K G& H  ¸I, &  /  ¢, *  is a hash function and  represents concatenation. The 
nonce produced by the tag provides unlinkability between two consecutive responses from the 
same tag. One the other side, the nonce from the reader prevents replay attacks. After receiving 
the response, the reader first finds a match with the first hash value of the response by hashing 
with all the keys of level 1. Whenever the reader obtains a match, the reader starts to search for 
the second hash value of the response by hashing with all the keys at the next level of the sub-tree 
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rooted at the node where the reader has found the match. The reader repeats this step until it 
reaches a leaf. Thus, the reader’s complexity is reduced to Í . In the worst case, the 
reader has to search with all the ¸ keys at each level of the tree and therefore, the complexity 
becomes ¸ Í . 
The major drawback of this approach is the loss of privacy if any tag is compromised by 
the adversary. Since the tags share keys with some of the tags in the system, whenever a single 
tag becomes compromised all the tags that share at least one key with the compromised tag have 
to sacrifice their privacy. Suppose the tag e in Figure 6.1 becomes compromised. All the tags of 
the system are partitioned into three disjoint sets. The adversary can now uniquely distinguish the 
tag | and identify the tags 	 and 
 as a unique partition. All the remaining tags (~ f } ) 
form a single partition because the tag e shares no key with them. Therefore each tag of this 
partition (~ f } ) is anonymous among these four tags. The privacy provided by this 
scheme diminishes as more and more tags are compromised by the adversary. 
Group based protocol. Avoine et al. [Avoine07] proposed a group based authentication 
protocol to address the privacy problem of the tree based hash protocol. According to this 
protocol, tags are divided into § disjoint groups of equal size. Each group is associated with a 
unique key that we refer to as a group key. Every tag shares this group key with other members of 
the given group. Additionally, each tag is assigned a unique key that is known only to the tag and 
the reader. Figure 6.2 shows the group organization of the tags where  8 Î and § 8 Õ. The ’s 
are the group keys, where &  /  §. The identifier of the th tag is represented by  (not shown 
in Figure 6.2) and the unique secret key of the same tag is denoted as 34, where &    Î. 
According to this protocol, the reader queries the tag with a nonce ). The tag, then, 
replies the following encrypted message (we assume that each tag has the knowledge of the 
encryption algorithm) with the nonce )Ñ produced by the tag. 
%)  )Ñ    Ö4 )  )Ñ* 
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Now the reader tries all the group keys to decrypt the first portion of the message. If the reader 
finds the right key that correctly decrypts the message, then the reader can learn  and decrypt 
the following portion of the response with the secret key of the tag . Thus, the reader verifies 
the tag’s legitimacy. This protocol reduces the complexity of both the reader and the tag. The tag 
always has to perform two encryptions. In the worst case, the reader has to perform §  & 
encryptions. In addition, each tag needs to store only two keys for the authentication. 
 
Figure 6.2: The group organization of the tags for the group based authentication protocol, with 
Ï 8 Ð and × 8 Ø 
The group organization of this protocol improves the level of privacy. If any tag is 
compromised by the adversary, then this compromised tag affects only the other members of its 
group. After compromising the tag, the adversary learns the group key and the tag’s secret key. 
Now the adversary can uniquely identify every single tag from the same group since the 
adversary can discover each tag’s identifier by decrypting the first portion of the response from 
each tag with the learned group key. All the remaining tags that belong to different groups form a 
single partition so that the adversary cannot distinguish the tags that belong to this partition. For 
instance, if the tag  e is compromised, the adversary can uniquely identify only the tag | (see 
Figure 6.2). The adversary cannot uniquely distinguish the other tags 	 
 ~ f } . Each of 
these tags remains anonymous among these six tags. This is definitely a significant improvement 
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in privacy protection of RFID systems in comparison with the other protocols, including the tree 
based hash protocol. 
Like other protocols, this protocol also has some limitations. There is a tradeoff between 
the number of groups and the group size. To reduce the complexity of the reader, the number of 
groups has to be minimized. In this case, with larger group size, more tags will face the loss of 
privacy if any tag becomes compromised. On the other hand, to keep the loss of privacy to a 
minimum, the group size needs to be reduced, which eventually increases the reader’s 
complexity. The loss of privacy increases for a system with large number of tags because to keep 
the reader’s complexity moderate, tags have to be divided into groups of large size. 
To address this problem, we propose an efficient anonymous private authentication 
(AnonPri) scheme that improves the privacy protection by keeping the reader’s complexity 
moderate. In our approach, each tag is assigned a couple of identifiers. A single tag shares some 
of its identifiers with some members of its group. Thus this protocol prevents tracking by 
increasing the uncertainty of the adversary. 
6.2.2 Privacy characterization 
In literature several different notions of privacy have been proposed so far. Some authors 
mention information privacy as the privacy of RFID systems. This privacy notion is the act of 
preventing a tag from disclosing its product information [Weis03, Ohkubo03]. But protecting 
information privacy keeps tags traceable. Therefore it is a weak notion of RFID privacy. Some 
define unlinkability as the strong notion of RFID privacy [Nohl06,Chatmon06]. Unlinkability 
means the inability to distinguish between the responses from the same tag and the responses 
from different tags of the system. Providing unlinkability ensures strong privacy when the 
adversary cannot distinguish between two tags with a probability better than random guessing 
[Juels07]. In our protocol, we protect privacy of the tags by providing unlinkability between two 
tags of the system. 
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The level of privacy obtained by any protocol can be measured using the anonymity set. 
Anonymity has been proposed in the context of mix-nets in [Diaz02]. Mix-nets are used to make 
the sender (and the recipient) of a message anonymous. The anonymity set is defined as the set of 
all potential senders (recipients) of the message. Anonymity is defined as being not identifiable 
among a group of entities, i.e., the members of the anonymity set. A higher degree of anonymity 
is achieved with an anonymity set of larger size. Perfect anonymity is achieved if the anonymity 
set contains all the members capable of sending (receiving) messages in the system. 
6.3 System model 
Our protocol is based on the group based scheme. Therefore, tags are divided into groups 
of equal size. Suppose,  is the total number of tags in the system and Ù is the number of groups. 
So, the group size is ) 8 ÚÛ . In this section, we define the components and parameters of our 
system.  
Issuer. The issuer initializes each tag during the deployment by writing the tag’s 
information into its memory. The issuer also authorizes the reader access to the tags. Even each 
group receives its unique group key and a pool of identifiers from the issuer. 
Group. Each group has a ) number of tags. The issuer assigns a unique group key % to 
the /th group  of the system. This key is shared between the members (tags) of this group. Each 
group also receives the following pool of identifiers from the issuer 
Ü 8 9	 
 H  ÝF 
where, &  /  Ù and Þ is a system parameter. The pools of any two groups do not share any 
identifier, i.e., Ü ß Ü 8 à J/ á . Each tag of the group  is assigned a couple of identifiers 
from Ü by the issuer.  
Tag. All the tags of the system are divided into Ù groups. Each tag receives the shared 
group key of the group that the tag belongs to, a unique secret key that is known only to the 
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reader and the tag itself, and a set of identifiers from the pool of identifiers of the group. Suppose, 
the tag  belongs to the group . This tag possesses the group key %, the unique secret key 
34, and a set of identifiers â. Each key is of ã bits, where ã is the security parameter of 
symmetric key encryption. We define the â as follows 
â 8 9Ó  x  H  äF 
where 
• each å  is chosen randomly following uniform distribution from the pool Ü and 
 K G& H  ÞI, where &    æ 
• å á ç , for all  á c 
• æ is also a system parameter and Þ ! æ. 
The identifiers are assigned to the tags in such a way that at least one identifier of a tag is 
shared with at least two other members of the same group. Therefore, we can say for the tag , 
¼º Pèå K é ß éê  
where º,P are any two members of  and º á P. 
Reader. The reader is connected to the backend server. In this chapter, we assume the 
communication channel between the reader and the backend server is secured. From now on, we 
denote the backend server as the reader. In our system, the tag is the prover and the reader is the 
verifier. The reader receives all the secret information by the issuer during the deployment. The 
issuer issues the reader a set of secret information for each group in the system 
ë 8 9ì%  íîï&  /  ÙF, where % is the secret group key and í is the mapping of the 
identifiers of the pool Ü with the secret keys of tags. Formally,  
í 8 9ì  ðîï&    Þ(C><( K ÜF 
where ð is the set of secret keys of tags associated with the . ð can be defined as an empty 
set if no tag is associated with the  or it can be a set of size at least one. Formally, 
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ð 8 ñ9òÓ  òx  H F(((ó¤=A=(ô K G	 
 H  ÚIà ?¤=Aó;E=
õ* 
System parameters. Since each tag receives æ identifiers randomly chosen from the 
pool of Þ identifiers, according to the  distribution strategy, we can say that each tag has at 
least one identifier common with at least two group members. The probability that each tag shares 
at least one identifier with at least two group members is 
ö÷ø 8 &   [
ùúä
ä 
ùä
û 
ùúxä
ä 
ùä
] 8 &   ÝÂ"ü
ý
ÝüxÝÂe"ü, where Þ þ )æ. 
For example, we consider an RFID system of 1000 tags divided in 10 groups. 100 tags 
are in each group. For simplicity, we assume Þ(= 100 and æ = 10. Then the probability that each 
tag shares at least one identifier with at least two group members is ö÷ø 8 96.87%. 
6.4 Our protocol: AnonPri 
In this section, we describe our protocol. The reader starts to query the tag with a nonce 
). Upon the reception of the query, the tag generates another nonce )Ñ. Suppose the reader 
interrogates the tag . In the second step, the tag picks an identifier, say å , from â. Then 
the tag computes  as shown in Figure 6.3. Here, *  denotes symmetric key encryption with 
key . The tag replies with the . Now the reader searches all the group keys until it finds the 
correct one that properly decrypts the first part (Q) of the response. If the reader retrieves the 
identifier å  that the tag used in its response, then the reader tries to decrypt the second part 
(b) of  with the potential set of secret keys (ð) associated with å . After finding the right 
secret key, the reader can uniquely identify the tag . Sharing some identifiers of a tag with other 
members of the group provide unlinkability even if any tag is compromised by the adversary. We 
will discuss this in section 6.7. 
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Reader l  Tag n 
Generate nonce, )   
 ) 1. Generate nonce )Ñ 
  2. Pick a å from â 
3.Q  % )  )Ñ  å, 
   b  Ö4 )  )Ñ, and 
     Q b  
   
1. . tries all the group keys 
until it decrypts Q to retrieve 
the å  
2. . lookups the key set ð 
associated with the å 
3. . tries all the keys  K ð 
until it decrypts b. 
4. If such a key exists, . 
accepts ,otherwise rejects  
  
Figure 6.3: The efficient anonymous private authentication protocol 
6.5 Attack model 
One of the major goals of an adversary in any RFID system is to infringe the tags’ 
privacy by means of tracking. In this chapter, an adversary is denoted as ,5. We assume ,5 as an 
active adversary who has full control over all the communications between the tag and the reader. 
She can not only eavesdrop, but also intercept, modify and even initiate authentication session. 
The adversary can, for example, impersonate a tag and communicate with the valid reader. Even 
the adversary can query a valid tag and learn the tag’s response. Our assumptions also include 
that the adversary can control a number of readers and tags. Each reader and tag controlled by the 
adversary are denoted as .d and d, respectively. .d is unauthorized to have access to any real tags 
since .d has no secret information like the real reader .. Similarly, d is not valid as it does not 
have the secret and identifying information of a valid tag. However, the adversarial reader .d can 
communicate with a valid tag. Even the fake tag d can communicate with a legitimate reader. In 
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both cases, the ultimate goal of the adversary is to track any tag of the RFID system. We assume 
that the adversary, the adversarial reader, and the adversarial tag have polynomially bounded 
resources. In addition, the adversary can launch physical attacks. However, the hardware based 
defenses against physical attacks are beyond the scope of this chapter. Our assumptions for this 
chapter also include that the reader cannot be compromised. 
6.6 Privacy model 
At the end of the protocol description, we mention that this protocol provide unlinkability 
and thereby preserves privacy. The adversary cannot link the responses with the tags, even if she 
can decrypt the first portion of the response and learn the identifier that the tags are using to 
produce the response. Like Juels and Weis [Juels07], we use an experiment based definitions to 
formalize RFID privacy. We conclude that the adversary cannot break unlinkability or invade 
privacy with probability better than random guessing. The following oracle-like construction 
exists: 
 is an oracle that randomly chooses some tags from all the  tags of the system. 
7Ñ takes a tag  as an input. Given the nonce ), the group key , the secret key 
3 and the set of identifiers â, the oracle randomly selects an  K â, generates another nonce 
and finally produces the response  8 Q b. It outputs the cipher text . 
 is an oracle that, provided with a tag , queries the tag and outputs the received 
response . 
Ò is an oracle that, provided with two tags  	, randomly chooses  K GÁ&I and 
queries the tag  using . Then it outputs the response . 
6.6.1 Information privacy against ,5 
Given a tag , the set of identifiers â stored on , and an identifier , an adversary can 
break the information privacy of our protocol if she can guess whether the tag  is using the . 
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Moreover, ã is the security parameter and  K 	 is the maximum number of time the adversary 
can query the tag . In addition, since the oracles of our privacy model are random, the inputs are 
computationally intractable from the outputs of the oracles. 
Experiment 
D©dLã M 
1. Setup: The issuer initializes the  tags of the system with their corresponding unique 
secret keys, the group keys, and the sets of identifiers after dividing the tags into Ù 
groups. It shares all the secret information with only the reader. 
2. Learning:  provides the adversary with a challenged tag  that the adversary 
queries  times and appends each response  to the list ¢ (initially ¢ is an empty list). 
3. Guess: Now the adversary transmits the tag  to the oracle 7Ñ with a nonce 
and receives a response  from the oracle. The adversary selects an identifier . 
Given the list of  responses in ¢, ,5 outputs 1 if she guesses that  is produced using 
, and 0 otherwise. ,5 is successful if her guess is right.  
Definition 1. AnonPri is said to preserve information privacy with security parameter ã 
and º`¾cã representing any polynomial function of ã, if  
J,5 °Aè
D©dLã M(Eª¥¥==<Eê  &  &º`¾cã* 
6.6.2 Unlinkability against ,5 
The adversary should not be able to distinguish between the two responses from the same 
tag.  
Experiment 
D©d7Ò7Lã M 
1. Setup: The issuer initializes the  tags of the system with their corresponding unique 
secret keys, the group keys, and the sets of identifiers after dividing the tags into Ù 
groups. It shares all the secret information with only the reader. 
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2. Learning:  provides the adversary with two challenged tags  	 from the 
same group. The adversary queries each tag  times and appends each response  	 
to the list ¢ (initially ¢ is an empty list). 
3. Guess: The adversary transmits  	 to the oracle Ò. ,5 receives the response  
from Ò. Given the list of responses ¢ and the response , the adversary guesses 
the value of b. ,5 succeeds if her guess is right. 
Definition 2. AnonPri is said to provide unlinkability with security parameter ã and 
º`¾cã representing any polynomial function of ã, if  
J,5 °Aè
D©d7Ò7Lã M(Eª¥¥==<Eê  &  &º`¾cã* 
6.7 Security and privacy analysis 
In this section, we formally prove that our protocol preserves data privacy and provides 
unlinkability. In addition, we analyze the preservation of privacy in some attack scenarios where 
some of the tags of the system are compromised by the adversary ,5. 
6.7.1 Information privacy 
Theorem 1. AnonPri preserves information privacy with respect to the adversary ,5. 
Proof. Let us assume  provides the adversary ,5 with a tag . ,5 transmits this tag to 
the oracle 7Ñ with a nonce )	. Then 7Ñ provides ,5 with the response .  
Now, ,5 selects a . To break data privacy, ,5 should tell if is produced using the . 
This implies that ,5 has to identify the input of the encryption by just learning the cipher text. ,5 
can succeed in two cases. First, if she can retrieve the inputs from the output of the random 
oracle. But this contradicts with our assumption that the inputs of a random oracle are 
computationally intractable from the output of the oracle. Second, if ,5 knows the secret keys of 
the tag . Without tampering the tag , if ,5 can determine the keys by learning the cipher texts, 
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this again breaks the semantic security of the symmetric key cryptography. Therefore ,5 can break 
data privacy with probability no better than random guessing. Thus it proves data privacy 
property of Definition 1.              
6.7.2 Unlinkability  
Theorem 2. AnonPri provides unlinkability with respect to the adversary ,5. 
Proof. Let us assume  provides the adversary ,5 with two tags  	 from the same 
group. These two tags go into the learning phase. ,5 transmits  	 to Ò which outputs the 
response . 
Now, to break unlinkability, the adversary ,5 has to tell the value of . We assume that 
the adversary’s guess is right. In other words, the adversary can determine whether the response 
 is produced by  or 	, given the learned responses from both the tags. The responses of a tag 
cannot be a signature of the tag because according to our protocol, a nonce on the tag side makes 
each response different from all the previous responses originated from the same tag. Therefore, 
we can say that the guess is right because the adversary knows the keys (the group key and the 
secret key) stored on these two tags.  Without tampering the tags  	, the adversary has to 
determine the keys stored on these tags by just observing the cipher texts. But this contradicts 
with the semantic security of symmetric key cryptography. Therefore the adversary can break 
unlinkability with no better approach than random guessing. Thus it proves the unlinkability 
property of Definition 2.         
6.7.3 Physical attack 
Under this attack, we consider that the adversary ,5 can compromise any tag with a 
probability of 	Ú. Whenever a tag  becomes compromised, the adversary learns all private 
information stored on the tag . Therefore, the adversary can now decrypt Q of each response  
originated from the other members of the group . Thus, ,5 can learn the identifier that a tag is 
73 
using to produce its response by decrypting the Q. We discuss the aftereffect of this attack with an 
example and demonstrate how AnonPri provides unlinkability even if the adversary realizes the 
identifiers used in the responses. 
 
Figure 6.4: Aftereffect of a physical attack on AnonPri, where n is compromised by the adversary 
We consider a group  of four tags 	 
 e and |. Suppose the adversary 
compromised the tag e as shown in Figure 6.4. Now the adversary learns the group key %, the 
tag secret key 3ý and a set of identifiers âe 8 G&ÕI. From now on, the adversary can decrypt 
Q part of all the responses originated from 	 
, and | with the group key %. But, the 
adversary still cannot decrypt b part of these responses since she does not possess the secret keys 
of these tags. With this learned information (% and âe), the adversary tries to track the other 
tags of this group. Since the adversary can decrypt Q of each responses, she can learn the 
identifier underlying the cipher text Q. In other words, she can discover which identifier has been 
used to produce a response. The arrow in the Figure 6.4 represents that the responses of the 
authentication sessions (after e is compromised) are transmitted from the tags (	 
 |) to the 
reader.  The identifiers used in these responses are shown on above the arrow. Each identifier is 
shown in plaintext since the adversary can retrieve the identifier by decrypting Q of  using %.  
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According to our protocol, even if the adversary comes to know about the identifier used 
in a response, she cannot conclude which of the potential tags is the sender of this response. In 
our example, the adversary discovers the identifier 2 is used two times, but she cannot be certain 
which of these tags (	 
 |) is the originator(s) of these responses. Though e shares the 
identifier 2 with only 	 and |, however, the adversary has no knowledge about the parties with 
whom e is sharing which of its identifiers. Even the adversary does not know how many of the 
identifiers of âe are being shared. So, under this scenario, the anonymity set of the potential 
senders of a given response seems to be 3 to the adversary. Therefore, when the adversary 
compromises one tag from the group of ) uncorrupted tags, AnonPri forms an anonymity set of 
size 1 and another anonymity set of size ()   &) from the group instead of ) anonymity sets of 
size 1 like the group based authentication [Avoine07]. This is the noticeable partition that 
improves the level of privacy provided by AnonPri. Because, the remaining    )(tags of the 
system forms the other anonymity set which is same under both the protocols. Thus AnonPri 
prevents the adversary to gain any benefit for tracking by compromising a tag. 
We now consider the case of compromising multiple tags of the same group. In the above 
scenario, even if ,5 compromises either 	 or | after compromising e, the adversary cannot be 
certain whether 
 has identifier 2 in â
 or not. Therefore, the size of anonymity set is still 2, i.e., 
)   ¹, where ¹ is the number of compromised tags of the group. If ,5 compromises 
 instead of 
	 or |, the size of anonymity set is still 2 (i.e., )   ¹). Therefore, we conclude that the 
anonymity set, formed from a group that is under physical attack, is of size ()   ¹), where ) is 
the group size and ¹ is the number of compromised tags of the given group. 
AnonPri provides protocol-level privacy only. In real world, there are many possible side 
channels. If tags emit distinct “radio-fingerprint”, then no protocol-level privacy countermeasures 
can prevent privacy infringement [Avoine05]. 
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6.8 Measurement of privacy 
In this section, we measure the level of privacy achieved by AnonPri as a function of the 
total number of compromised tags. We consider two privacy metrics for the measurement of 
privacy. First, our privacy measurement technique is based on anonymity set like the privacy 
metric used by Avoine et al. [Avoine07]. Second, we identify the amount of information 
disclosed by a scheme as another metric presented in [Nohl06]. This metric is based on 
Shannon’s information theorem [Shannon48]. 
6.8.1 Measurement of privacy based on anonymity set 
The level of privacy of an RFID system, achieved by a scheme, at a given time, is a 
function of the total number of compromised tags at that time. When some tags are compromised, 
the set of all tags are partitioned such that the adversary cannot distinguish the tags belong to the 
same partition, but she can distinguish the tags that belong to different partitions. Therefore, these 
partitions become the anonymity sets of their members. The level of privacy based on anonymity 
set, , can be measured as the average anonymity set size [Avoine07]. 
 8 & || || 8
&

 ||
  
where || denotes the size of partition  and |¿%||Ú| is the probability that a randomly chosen tag 
belongs to partition . 
According to AnonPri, a similar kind of partitions is formed when tags become 
compromised. If ¹ is the number of compromised tags within group , then the set of the tags 
within this group is partitioned into ¹ anonymity sets of size 1 and another anonymity set of size 
)   ¹. If  8 G¹|¹ (;E(?¤=(??C(¥¨©A¨;E=<(?CE(ó;?¤;>(I is the set of compromised 
groups, || is the total number of compromised groups, and + 8 ∑ ¹ø÷(%K  is the total number 
of compromised tags, the level of privacy  achieved by AnonPri can be expressed as 
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   ¹  )   ¹
=C¥¤(%K  
where 
•  = total number of tags in the system 
• ) = total number of tags within a group 
• Ù = total number of groups in the system. 
6.8.2 Measurement of privacy based on information leakage 
We measure the information leakage in bits based on Shannon’s information theorem 
[Shannon48]. If we have a group of tags of size  and the adversary divides this group into two 
disjoint subgroups of size , then 1 bit of information is disclosed out of 
  bits. Extending 
this concept from two subgroups of equal size to two subgroups of different sizes, where ø tags 
are in one subgroup and the remaining tags &   	ø  are in another subgroup, we can measure 
the average amount of information disclosed in bits as follows 
 8 &R 
R 
R   &
R 
 
R
R   &* 
In general, if the adversary splits  tags of the system into  disjoint partitions, then  
 8  || ' 
 [ ||]

	  
where || denotes the size of partition . 
According to our protocol, if  8 G¹|¹(is the total compromised tags within(I is the set 
of compromised groups, || is the total number of compromised groups, and + 8 ∑ ¹ø÷(%K  is 
the total number of compromised tags, the amount of information leakage in bits  can be 
expressed as 
 8 )Ù   || 
 [

)Ù   ||]  ¹ [
&
 
 ] 
)   ¹
 
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
)   ¹]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where 
•  = total number of tags in the system 
• ) = total number of tags within a group 
• Ù = total number of groups in the system. 
6.8.3 Experimental results 
We have compared both the protocols, AnonPri and the group based authentication, using 
a Matlab simulation. The experiment results establish that the level of privacy provided by 
AnonPri is higher than that of the group based authentication. Our comparison is based on the 
two metrics presented above, the level of privacy (based on anonymity set) and information 
leakage. We have come up with a conclusion same as [Nohl06] that the information leakage 
describes the privacy threats better than the anonymity set. 
In our simulation, we have considered two systems with  8 	f Ù 8 Õ and  8

 Ù 8 Õ. Tags are selected to be compromised with a uniform random distribution. The 
number of compromised tags ranges from 0 to 160. We have run the simulation for 100 times and 
computed the average  achieved by AnonPri and the group based authentication as a function of 
the total number of compromised tags + (see Figure 6.5 (a)-(b)). The small increase in the level of 
privacy achieved by AnonPri is visible when the total number of compromised tags becomes 
more than 30. 
During the simulation, we have also computed the average amount of information 
leakage , for both the protocols, as a function of the total number of compromised tags + (see 
Figure 6.5 (c)-(d)). The plots depict that a significant amount of improvement in privacy 
protection is achieved by AnonPri. With the increase in the total number of compromised tags +, 
the average amount of information disclosed by the group based authentication is quite higher 
than the information disclosed by AnonPri. In Figure 6.5(c) ( 8 	f, when + becomes 160, the  
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(a) Level of privacy based on anonymity set, with 
 8 	f and Ù 8 Õ 
 
(b) Level of privacy based on anonymity set, with 
 8 
 and Ù 8 Õ 
 
(c) The amount of information leakage, with  8 	f and 
Ù 8 Õ 
 
(d) The amount of information leakage, with  8 
 and 
Ù 8 Õ 
Figure 6.5: Experimental results of AnonPri against the group based authentication 
group based authentication discloses about 15 bits out of 16 bits of information, while AnonPri 
discloses about 6 bits of information. The group based authentication discloses 56.25% more 
information than AnonPri in a similar setup. Figure 6.5(d) ( 8 
) shows that the group based 
authentication reveals almost 19 bits out of 20 bits of information and AnonPri reveals around 6 
bits of information. This time the group based authentication discloses 65% more information 
than AnonPri. Based on the simulation results, we can conclude that the information disclosed by 
the group based authentication increases with the size of the system; however, AnonPri shows 
consistency in the information leakage in both the cases. 
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Information leakage is a better metric to demonstrate the privacy threats in RFID systems 
than anonymity set. Though the improvement in  provided by AnonPri against the group based 
authentication is not significant, however, we can say that AnonPri provides better privacy 
protection than the group based authentication, based on the results of the amount of information 
disclosed by these two protocols. 
6.9 Discussion 
In this section, we discuss the limitations of AnonPri. 
Search complexity. According to AnonPri, the reader’s complexity is slightly increased 
than the group based scheme [Avoin07]. After receiving the response  8 Q b from a tag , 
the reader searches for the correct group key to decrypt Q. In the worst case, the reader has to 
perform this operation Ù times. If such a group key exists, the reader can retrieve the identifier 
å  from Q. Now, the reader has to search for the tag’s secret key to identify  by decrypting b 
properly. The reader searches a key space of size |ð|. Therefore, in the worst case, the reader’s 
total complexity is Ù  |ð|. In the best case, the size of ð is 3 and in the worst case, it can be ), 
size of the group. But in the group based scheme, the reader’s complexity in worst case is Ù  &. 
Nevertheless, AnonPri is much better than the other schemes where the worst case reader’s 
complexity is , the number of total tags in the system. To provide improvement in privacy 
protection, we have to sacrifice this small increase in the complexity of the reader. Since readers 
are more powerful than tags, they can handle this increase in search complexity. 
Memory complexity. According to AnonPri, tags need to store æ number of identifiers 
along with the group key and the unique secret key. Though tags have limited resources, 
however, the increase in memory requirement is acceptable than the increase in computation and 
communication complexity. A smart RFID tags have memory capacity of 32kBytes or more 
[Laurie07]. Even RFID tags with extended memory capacity are available at the market 
[Fujitsu08]. All these tags can store the information required for AnonPri. 
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6.10 Summary 
RFID systems will be welcomed for many applications if the system can guarantee 
consumer privacy as well as improve scalability. To address the tradeoff between privacy and 
scalability, we have proposed an efficient anonymous private authentication protocol (AnonPri) 
in this chapter. We have presented a brief comparison between the tree based hash protocol and 
the group based authentication for RFID systems. Then we have presented a privacy definition 
that an RFID system should consider. A detail security and privacy analysis of AnonPri 
establishes that AnonPri preserves information privacy as well as unlinkability. In addition, 
AnonPri provides higher level of privacy than the group based scheme when some of the tags are 
compromised by the adversary. However, according to AnonPri, the reader faces a slight increase 
in the search complexity, which is much better than performing linear search in the database to 
identify a single tag. Finally, we can say that AnonPri is suitable for many applications where 
privacy violation is a major point-of-failure. 
  
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Future Work 
In this chapter, we summarize the contribution of this thesis and present some future 
research directions. 
7.1 Conclusions 
In this thesis, we focus on private authentication protocols to protect privacy and ensure 
security of RFID systems. The research achievements of this thesis are as follows: 
In chapter 2, we have identified six security and privacy requirements of an RFID system. 
We have also presented how these requirements form the safety ring. These requirements are the 
real need that an RFID system must achieved before deployment. If any of the six requirements is 
not fulfilled by an RFID system, then the system will be at a risk of privacy violation and/or 
security attacks. Later in this chapter, we have assessed some significant RFID authentication 
protocols based on symmetric key cryptography against the safety ring. Since some recent 
publications provide evidence about the feasibility of public key cryptography (e.g., Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography (ECC)) implementation on RFID tags, we have briefly discussed and made 
reference to those articles for interested readers. 
In chapter 3, we have proposed a lightweight serverless authentication protocol for 
typical RFID tags that can perform simple symmetric key operations. This protocol makes use of 
pseudo random number generator (PRNG) and one way hash function to provide the security and 
privacy requirements of RFID systems. Since this protocol is serverless, the system is no longer 
vulnerable to the single point-of-failure. We have presented the security and privacy analysis of 
the protocol with respect to our proposed attack model. We have assessed the cost of this protocol 
in terms of storage, computation and communication. Two additional features of this protocol, 
ownership transfer and scalability, are presented in this chapter. We have explained how the 
current owner (a reader) of a tag can transfer the ownership information to a new owner (another 
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reader). Finally, we have compared this protocol with some significant RFID authentication 
protocols based on the identified security and privacy requirements. 
In chapter 4, we have defined the desynchronizing attack on RFID systems. We have 
proposed a robust private authentication protocol for RFID systems that not only supports 
recovery of the disabled tags but also protects privacy and prevents security attacks. We have, 
then, exemplified how this protocol recovers an RFID system that is under the desynchronizing 
attack. Later we have analyzed this protocol against our identified security and privacy 
requirements. 
In chapter 5, we have presented that anti-counterfeiting is one of major needs for the 
widespread development of RFID systems. To address the counterfeiting problem, we have 
proposed authentication protocol which is entirely based on Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). 
Though ECC is a class of public key cryptography, however, this protocol does not publicly share 
the public key of a tag. This protocol is a mutual authentication protocol as it provides reader-to-
tag and tag-to-reader authentication. We have analyzed how this protocol is secure against 
common major attacks with respect to our proposed attack model. 
In chapter 6, we have presented the tradeoff between scalability and privacy of RFID 
systems. We have explained two significant solutions to this problem – tree based hash protocols 
and group based authentication. We have, then, analyzed the limitations of these protocols. We 
have characterized the RFID privacy and proposed an efficient anonymous authentication 
protocol for RFID systems. A privacy model for RFID systems based on random oracles has been 
proposed in this chapter. Later we have analyzed and formally proved that our protocol protects 
the privacy of RFID tags. Finally we have described the reader’s complexity and the tag’s 
memory complexity of this protocol. 
7.2 Future work 
In this section, we present some future research directions in RFID security and privacy. 
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• Ensuring perfect privacy protection results in an RFID system with poor 
scalability. On the other hand, to achieve better scalability, an RFID system has 
to sacrifice some privacy. This tradeoff should be studied further for the 
development of better solutions that can ensure perfect privacy protection as well 
as better scalability. 
• In this thesis, we consider the communication channel between a reader and the 
server is secure. However, this channel is also subject to security attacks. 
Ensuring secure communication over this channel can be a new research 
direction. 
• In chapter 3, we have presented a technique for ownership transfer where reader 
to reader communication is required. We have considered that readers can 
communicate with other readers through a secure channel. Authentication over 
this channel can be fruitful topic. 
• Some authentication protocols have recently been proposed based on public key 
cryptography. A further study on this area can be productive for some good 
solutions to RFID security and privacy problems. 
  
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Appendix A 
Glossary of terms 
Term Definition 
RFID  Radio Frequency IDentification is the use of a wireless 
transponder embedded into objects for automatic 
identification and tracking of assets, animals and/or 
persons. 
RFID tag An RFID tag is an identification device which usually has 
an identifier and which transmits data wirelessly using 
radio frequency (RF) in response to interrogation by an 
RFID reader 
RFID reader An RFID reader is a transceiver that interrogates and read 
data from tags by broadcasting an RF signal using its 
antenna. 
Backend server/ central server/ 
backend database 
A backend server can retrieve the detailed information of a 
tag from its database by using the tag’s response as a key. 
Security Techniques that control who may use or modify the 
computer system or the information contained in it 
Privacy The notion of controlling where, when, to whom and what 
amount of information is provided to the external entities 
Identification In RFID systems, identification means the act of retrieving 
the identity of tags. 
Authentication Authentication means the act of confirming someone (or 
something) as authentic. 
Mutual authentication Mutual authentication is the act of proving one party’s 
identity to the other communicating party and vice versa. 
Private authentication Private authentication is the act of proving one party’s 
identity to the other communicating party using shared 
secrets (e.g., cryptographic keys, seeds of PRNG)  
Symmetric key cryptography A class of algorithms for cryptography that use shared 
secret cryptographic keys 
Public key cryptography A class of algorithms for cryptography that use a pair 
cryptographic key: public key (known to public) and 
private key (known only to the owner). 
 
